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Abstract
Title of Research paper:

Economic approach of piracy along the Maritime
Silk Road and cost analysis of the Northern Sea
Route

Degree:

MSC

Traditional piracy or the simple robbery of ships’ equipment and stores has been
replaced by modern piracy operating with the aid of international criminal
organizations now terrorize the international shipping industry by hijacking ships,
incarcerating crew and cargo and detaining both for ransom. The unwillingness of
ship owners to report such incidents due to fears of rising insurance premiums as
well as lengthy and expensive investigations have allowed for the rampant growth of
piracy. Thus, this paper is focused on the Northern Sea Route as a solution to piracy
which occurs along the main trade route between Europe and Asia, through the
Suez Channel and Malacca Straights. This paper provides a radically different
solution to the global phenomenon of piracy with the substitution of the main trade
route by the Northern Sea Route. An economic analysis of piracy will estimate and
evaluate the total expenses of piracy on the shipping industry. This paper will also
give a brief introduction of the NSR and the environmental changes due to which the
ice is melting and will also conduct a cost analysis of the operational, voyage and
capital costs of a container ship sailing along the Northern Sea Route. Finally, the
costs of piracy and cost of sailing along the NSR will be compared while a fuzzy
comprehension evaluation analyses will evaluate the importance of all the fuzzy or
uncertain factors in terms of environmental, policy and technological issues that may
influence the development of the NSR.

KEYWORDS: Piracy, Economic Impact, Northern Sea Route, Maritime Silk Road,
Substitution, Feasibility Analysis, Cost Analysis, Fuzzy Comprehensive Evaluation
Model.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 Background
Since 1956, when Malcolm McLean loaded 58 containers on the 20-year-old
modified tanker, “Ideal X”, international transportation and global trade have
experienced tremendous growth (Muller,1999). The further maturation of information
technologies and integrated logistics services in correlation with outsourcing of
production processes, to countries with low cost labour, have been some of the
factors that contributed to the development of sea transportation; resulting in more
than 80% of the world's merchandised goods being carried by sea (United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development, 2008). The most important shipping
corridor is the maritime route passing through the Malacca Straights and Gulf of
Aden linking Asian and European markets known as the Maritime Silk Route (MSR) 1 .

Despite the development of maritime transportation and global trade due to
globalization there is still an imbalance among the countries that have actually
benefited from the globalized economic era. According to the United Nations, forty
countries face food crisis due to the increased price of food commodities and oil. On
the other hand and due to the slow responsiveness of the developed countries to
solve the problem of poverty in developing countries, individuals are easily tempted
to resort to and exercise the most ancient criminal act of violence at sea, piracy
(Petretto, 2008). Piracy has a great economic impact on shipping industry that some
experts have estimated to be around $16 billion per year. Piracy was never
successfully eliminated while due to the development of more integrated logistic
services piracy attacks have a great impact on the international trade. Financial loss
caused by piracy in terms of ransoms paid, damages to the ship and cargo,
increasing insurance premiums and operational cost impose great pressure on the
shipping industry.

On the other hand, the rapid environmental changes that have been taking place
over the last three decades turned the eyes of the international maritime community

1 cf paragraph 2.4
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towards the Arctic Ocean. The rapid decrease of the sea ice extent along the
Eurasian continental shelf creates a new maritime route that could link the areas of
the North Pacific and North Atlantic Ocean, known as The Northern Sea Route
(NSR) 2 . NSR could save more than 50%, in terms of distance and eventually partly
substitute the traditional MSR providing thus a solution to piracy. The exploration of
the Arctic Ocean in terms of natural resources will further develop the NSR by using
tanker vessels and bulk carriers to transport oil, hydrocarbons, coal, timber and
woods products from the region of the Russian Arctic continental self; however,
Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit (TEU) containers are the most appropriate cargo for
transit transportation. Environmental, administration, legal, insurance and technical
issues need to be considered and further discussed. The possibility of piracy or
even maritime terrorist attacks along the NSR will be eliminated due to the extreme
environmental conditions and inaccessibility of the Arctic region, providing a safer
passage through the Arctic Ocean. Studies regarding the Arctic sea ice extent
predict 40% decrease of ice along the NSR for the next twenty years 3 making even
more attractive the idea of using the NSR for seaborne transportation.

1.2 Literature Review

The amazingly well organized pirating against the Saudi Arabian Very Large Crude
Carrier (VLCC) “Sirius Star” in 2008 is evidence that piracy has developed at an
alarming pace (Menkhaus, 2009). Shipping companies in order to prevent piracy will
install expensive equipment on board the vessels, hire armed security contractors
and substitute traditional trade routes adding thousands of dollars to the daily
operating cost. An effect of the increased levels of piracy along the Maritime Silk
Road and more specific along the coastal nations in the Gulf of Aden is the fact that
many shipping companies prefer to sail around the Cape of Good Hope which
eventually reduces the risk of piracy, however; at the same time increases the daily

2 C.f paragraph 4.3
3 Whitney, Bradley, & Brown. (2001). Naval Operations in an Ice Free Arctic. Naval
Operations in an Ice-free Arctic Symposium 17-18 April 2001 Final Report, from
http://www.natice.noaa.gov/icefree/FinalArcticReport.pdf
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operational cost of the merchant vessels (Khalid, 2008a). In another article ‘Some
Reflections on Combating Piracy in the Gulf of Aden’ Khalid (2008b) mentioned that
maritime supply chains and international trade which are both closely related to
speed and efficiency might suffer due to the prolongation of steaming time.

In addition, Costello (2008) in the article, “Shipping Insurance Cost Soars with
Piracy Surge off Somalia”, states that insurance companies might increase the
insurance premium which is a significant factor that determines a percentage of the
freight rate. Costello (2008) also mentions that in the year 2008 insurance premiums
for sending a cargo through the Gulf of Aden have increased to $9000 from $900
last year. Despite the fact that shipping companies, with the above mentioned
means of prevention, might reduce the risk of piracy, the dilemma of piracy and cost
of piracy prevention still remain. According to Glen, Dragonette, and Young (2007)
threats and acts of piracy can not be prevented or eliminated in isolation from the
shore, especially if we take into consideration the 199 piracy attacks, 581 hostages,
7 missing crew members and 9 deaths that have taken place along the MSR the first
nine months of 2008 (International Chamber of Commerce, 2008). The economic
impact of piracy on the shipping industry is approximately $16 billions due to the
loss of ships, cargoes, paid ransoms and increased insurance premium (Luft & Korin,
2004). The need for alternative maritime trade routes that will eliminate the risk of
piracy but at the same time optimize vessels’ operational costs and distance is
imperative.

The idea of a short passage between Asia and Europe via the Arctic was developed
in the 15th century due to European maritime nations’ curiosity about and scientific
studies on the arctic’s natural resources (Borodachev, 2007). “The Northern Sea
Route (NSR) is a national transportation route under full Russian control and
jurisdiction, stretching from the archipelago of Novaya Zemlya in the west to the
Bering Strait in the east connecting the European and Asian continents, and passing
through the seas of Chukchi, Barent, Kara, Laptev and East Siberian” (Ostreng,
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2000). As professor Valsson (2007) states, the distance from Rotterdam to
Shanghai through the Suez Canal is approximately 9.600 miles, while the distance
from Iceland to the Pacific Ocean through the NSR is only 3.500 miles; an
enormously redundant distance and fuel consumption, which actually accounts up to
50% of the operational costs of a vessel (Stopford, 1997).

Taking also into consideration canal fees, insurance premium for critical piracy zone,
fuel consumption, operational costs and all the expenses that determine the freight
rate, the above mentioned shortcut could save 20% of the operational cost of
container vessel for a single trip, from $17 million to $14 million per year (Borgerson,
2008). The Northern Sea Route is not only appealing because of the enormous, up
to 40% mile redundancy, compared to the main trade route between Europe and
Asia but also due to the low risk of piracy and maritime terrorism and due to huge
Russian Arctic reserves of natural resources such as gas, oil and minerals which are
in high demand in both Europe and the United States (Offerdal, 2008). Russia will
then be able to export its natural resources to both Western and Eastern markets
using the NSR. On the other hand, the increased effects of global warming make the
idea of using the North East Route to avoid piracy even more attractive. The obvious
decrease in the thickness of Arctic Sea ice, Parkinson and Cavaliery (1999), and the
thickness of the ice covering the Arctic Ocean Rothrock, Yu and Maykut (1999)
reveals the alarming environmental situation, but on the other hand it introduces
opportunities for the shipping industry. Between 2004 and 2005, the Arctic lost 14%
of its permanent ice - the main obstacle to maritime transportation. In the last 23
years, 41% of this ice has melted away (Borgerson, 2008). The most optimistic
models predict that an ice free NSR will be a reality in the summer of 2013
(Alexandrov et al, 2007). However, the extreme environmental conditions of the
Arctic low temperatures, ice thickness and high winds followed by snowfalls hinder
the ability to perform adequate scientific research (Holland, 2002). The NSR is
seasonably available and even its availability between two seasons is unpredictable,
(Tirschewell, 2007), causing uncertainty for the navigation along the route in terms
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of specified time periods. In addition, not much academic research, focused on the
suitability of the NSR for commercial purposes, has been conducted while most of
the available information is based on private research institutions, making these
sources not completely reliable.

According to International Maritime Bureau, Annual report of Piracy and armed
robbery against ships, (2008), 48 Bulk Carriers, 49 Containers Ships, 38 General
Cargo and 30 Tankers have been attacked by pirates. Considering the average
speed of these ships, it is clear that vessels with lower speeds are more appealing
to pirates. As a matter of fact, the North Sea Route could be a good alternative route
for Tankers, Bulk Carriers, General Cargoes and Chemical/Product Tankers.
However for transit transportation between Europe and the East container vessels
seems to be the most appropriate. Despite the enormous reduction of sailing days
and fuel consumption, in the long run, the development of a network to support the
maritime transportation of goods in the Arctic region demands a huge amount of
investments in related infrastructure. Design and construction of ships for ice, land
based infrastructure for pollution prevention, information technology, establishment
of search and rescue centres, crew training, real time information on weather and
ice conditions are some of the factors that need to be taken into consideration by the
shipping industry for the implementation of the NSR project, Bobylev et al. (1994),
as well as safety equipment on the vessels and real time communications for
immediate response in case of emergency (Ranger, 2000).

However, the melting of ice is not good news for everyone especially for animals
that depend on the permanent ice cover for procreation (Holland, 2002). As a matter
of fact environmental issues should be taken seriously into consideration due to the
increasing shipping activity that would lead to industrial development and growth of
population (Lathrop, 2008). Experts of the maritime industry are skeptical regarding
the implementation of the NSR. Oil spills like the one caused by the Exxon Valdez in
1989 in Prince William Sound, Alaska, could cause a significant environmental

5

disaster. Although there are many projects that have been developed for the use of
the NSR for commercial purposes, a concrete conclusion as to when the NSR will
be totally free from ice can not be determined.

Currently the passage is ice free only for four months during the summer months
and sometimes navigation along the NSR is restricted by severe sea ice conditions.
The resulting unpredictability of ice conditions demands the use of icebreakers
along the Northern Sea Route (Johannessen et al. 1997). The use of Icebreakers
could add a significant cost for the navigation of the NSR and even overcome its
advantages in terns of miles and fuel consumption redundancy (Dibenedetto, 2006).
The developing of “Double Acting Vessels” with both ice-strengthened and Ice
breaking capabilities will be the solution to the expensive Russian fleet of
icebreakers (Arpiainen & Kiili, 2006). Nevertheless several other factors such as
legal and marine insurance can impose great limitations on the development of the
NSR. Although Russia national legislation that governs the NSR is based on the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, a rather discriminatory policy in
terms of NSR fees and regulations has been imposed towards foreign vessels
(Brubaker & Ostreng, 1999). The lack of adequate marine insurance and
infrastructure for navigation along the NSR impose restrictions, however the
increasing demand for transportation will definitely provide the means to balance
any such limitations.

1.3 Methodology
The purpose of this paper is to estimate the annual economic impact of piracy on
the shipping industry and then to suggest the development of the NSR, for transit
transportation between Europe and Asia, as a solution to the increasing piracy
incidents along the MSR. To achieve the above mentioned goal, this dissertation will
first analyse the main factors that fuel piracy and then will estimate the financial loss
of the direct and indirect impacts of piracy attacks. On the shipping industry, in terms
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of cargo and vessels losses, ransoms for kidnaps, increasing operational cost of the
vessels, environmental threats, investment on anti-piracy equipment, insurance
premiums, investigations and off-hire.

The next step will be a cost analysis of a container vessel sailing along the Eurasian
continent in order to identify the annual cost of a TEU for transit transportation. All
the components that form the expenses, of a 5,000 TEU container vessel such as
capital, operational and voyage expenses will be identified and estimated based
mostly on studies conducted by international private institutions such as the Aker
Technology Inc 4 . As soon as the cost for transporting one TEU container has been
identified the next step will be a comparative analysis of the annual economic impact
of piracy and the annual total cost of the container vessel sailing along the NSR.
Furthermore, fuzzy comprehensive evaluation analysis of the NSR will follow to
highlight the importance of environmental, policy and technical issues that need to
be considered for the further development of the NSR. The statistical data based on
which the evaluation will take place derive from questionnaire that the author
developed and sent to evaluators. Finally, this thesis will provide author’s
conclusions and suggestions.

1.4 Structure
Chapter one gives an introduction of the thesis followed by the literature review of
studies focused on piracy and the NSR. The thesis’s objectives and methodology
used as well as structure and finally the difficulties the author faced during the
research process can also be found in chapter one. Chapter two introduces and
defines the phenomenon of piracy as well as highlights the trends of piracy along
the MSR. Further analysis regarding the factors that fuel piracy can also be found in
chapter two. In chapter three the author will conduct an analysis with which the
annual financial loss of the shipping industry due to piracy incidents will be
estimated. Chapter four will introduce the Northern Sea Route and the
4 Arpiainen, M & Kiili, R. (2006). Arctic shuttle container link from Alaska US to Europe. Aker
Arctic Technology Inc project, report K-63.
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environmental changes that are responsible for the melting of ice and present a
case study conducted in order to identify the total expenses of a 5,000 TEU
container vessel sailing along the NSR. Based on the annual expenses of the vessel
in terms of operational, voyage and capital cost in relation to the annual amount of
cargo transferred between Europe and Asia the transportation cost of a single TEU
transit will be indentified. In chapter five the author will make a comparison analysis
between the annual cost of piracy and cost of sailing along the NSR while a further
fuzzy comprehensive evaluation analysis will evaluate factors that according to
experts opinion have an increased level of uncertainty that may influence the
development of NSR in terms of environmental, technical and policy aspects. Finally,
chapter six will provide the author’s conclusion and recommendations.

1.5 Restrictions
Lack of resources regarding the economic potential of the Northern Sea Route was
definitely one of the main restrictions of this thesis. Although many e-mails were
sent to companies that operate regionally in the Arctic Ocean the author never
received any reply and therefore he faced many difficulties in collecting information
regarding the operational cost of a vessel sailing along the Northern Sea Route.
Most of the conclusions the author made depended on past research papers of
fellow students and academics as well as on private institutions’ projects and
simulations that date back to 1999. Even though everyone is aware of the great
shipping opportunity to develop a new revolutionary trade route, very few academic
studies exist and most of them simply state at the recognition of the obvious
economic potential of using the NSR for commercial purposes without taking any
further action or continuing the research on the viability of the idea. Nevertheless the
author was surprised to find that many academic studies on piracy have been
conducted but most of them are only focused on the theoretical side of the
phenomenon while the practical -in terms of impacts- side of piracy, which is the
most important, has been almost neglected. The author is fully aware of the fact that
his attempt to link piracy and the Northern Sea Route in terms of economic
approach is a very challenging one, however this very fact constitutes a motivation
for further research in the future.
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Chapter 2 Overview of Piracy

2.1 Definition of Piracy & Issues to be considered
According to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, (1982) Part VII,
Article 101 piracy is defined as follows:

(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depreda-tion, committed
for
private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private
aircraft, and directed: (i) On the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or
against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; (ii) Against a ship,
aircraft, persons or property in a place out-side the jurisdiction of any State;
(b) Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with
knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
(c) Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in
subparagraph (a) or (b) (Part VII, Section 1, Article 101)
The International Maritime Bureau, (n.d.) a specialized division of the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) established in 1981 to fight against all types of crimes
at sea defines piracy as follows:
An act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with the intent to commit theft
or any other crime and with the intent or capability to use force in the furtherance
of that act, (IMB, n.d.)
The existence of two definitions with different scope creates significant problems
regarding the prevention and reduction of piracy attacks. First of all we need to
mention that both of the definitions refer to piracy as an attack on a ship, which
actually differs from the piracy activities, of the past, to coast raiding for slaves and
valuable goods (Warren, 2001). The definition of IMB is wider in scope since there is
no distinction between territorial and high seas and the absent of the two ships
requirement recognize violent acts, from a raft or a quayside of a port, as actual acts
of piracy. IMB definition will also recognize attacks on a ship, for environmental or
social political reason, as acts of piracy.

9

The question that rises from the existence of two definitions is whether the relevant
statistical reports include the same number of piracy attempts or acts. The
unwillingness of ship-owners to report incidents of violence at sea due to very long
and expensive investigations is the main factor that restricts accurate statistical
reports. IMB piracy reporting centre consider that 50% of the piracy incidents remain
unreported while IMO assumes that only one third of actual and attempted piracy
attacks are reported (Van der Meidjen, 2008, pp 19).

International Maritime Organization, (2002a) in an attempt to resolve the conflict
between the two definitions adopted the “Code of Practice for the Investigation of
Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships”. According to this code an
additional definition of “Armed Robbery” has been included to encounter the gaps
between the UNCLOS and IMB definitions of piracy. IMO defines Armed Robbery as:

Any unlawful act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat
thereof, other than an act of piracy, directed against a ship or against persons or
property on board such ship, within a State’s jurisdiction over such offences.
(IMO, 200a)
The definitions of UNCLOS and the “Code of Practice for the Investigation of Crimes
of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships” are closer with the definition of the IMB
but still there are issues to be taken into consideration and critical thought must be
developed towards the reliability of the statistical reports that will be also used in this
thesis. According to International maritime Organization (1993) three kind of piracy
exist: Low-Level Armed Robbery carried out by groups of petty thieves and small
crafts, Medium-Level Armed Robbery carried out by better organized groups of
people heavily armed, Major Criminal Hijacks involves cargo, ships and crews
missing as well as extreme violent acts conducted by heavily armed well organized
groups. Figure 1 depicts the development of piracy over the years, by location, from
1984 to 2007; it is obvious that since mid-90s piracy attacks increase at an alarming
pace.
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Figure 1- Annual Piracy Attacks by location since 1984
Source: IMO, (2009). Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea. UK: IMO.
http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D25429/Piracy_30April2009_.pdf

2.2 Trends of Piracy along the Maritime Silk Road
During the last three decades seaborne trade has experienced a tremendous growth
with an annual average rate of around 3.2 percent and with more than 80 percent of
the world's merchandised goods being carried by sea (UNCTAD, 2008). Figure 2
depicts the development of world seaborne trade from 1994 to 2007 compared with
world’s Gross Domestic Product 5 . One of the most important shipping corridors in
terms of cargo volume and vessels traffic is the Maritime Silk Road (MSR),
stretching from the Red Sea to South China Sea, crossing the Indian Ocean and
passing along the Gulf of Aden, Bay of Bengal and through the Malacca straights,
linking the European and Asian economies (Wikipedia, 2009). The blue line of figure
3 depicts the Maritime Silk Road stretching from China to Europe.

5 Gross Domestic Product is a basic measure of world’s economic performance and consists of the
value of all the final products and service produced our the world, Wikipedia (2009).
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Figure 2-Growth of World Seaborne Trade
Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, (2008). Review of maritime
Transport. NY & Genova: UN. http:// www.unctad.org/en/docs/rmt2008_en.pdf

Figure 3- Maritime Silk Road
Source: Wikipedia,(2009).Maritime Silk Road
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Silk_Route_extant.JPG

Approximately 60,000 vessels per year pass through the Malacca Straights carrying
30% of global trade between European and Asian markets. It has been estimated
that each day 10.3 million barrels of oil are carried through Malacca Straights, an
amount equal to 50% of the world’s crude oil (Voon, 2008). In 2007 20,384 vessels
have passed through the Gulf of Aden and Suez Canal carrying 700 million tones of
cargo to Europe, Asia and Africa; an amount equal to 14% of world’s goods carried
by sea and 30% of global crude oil (Suez Maritime Authority, 2008). Figure 4 shows
the number of ships passed through Suez Canal from 2000 to 2008 heading to
Europe and Vice Versa.
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Figure 4-Vessels Passed Through Suez Canal
Source: Drawn by the Author © Petroskelaiditis WMU-SMU, (ITL 09) based on Suez
Maritime Authority, (2008). Brief Yearly Statistical Report of Ships Traffic.

According to International Maritime Bureau, Annual Report for piracy Annual report:
Piracy and armed robbery against ships, (2009) 293 actual and attempted piracy
attacks were reported in 2008 which is 11% higher than what was reported in 2006
and 2007. The region of Gulf of Aden and Somalia has a catalytic role for this spate
of violent acts at sea.
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Figure 5-Piracy Incidents by Location, 2008
Source: Drawn by the Author © Petroskelaiditis WMU-SMU, (ITL 09) based on Piracy and
Armed Robbery against Ships. Annual report, UK: ICC. http://www.icc-ccs.org (Requested
via email)

In 2008, 139 cases of piracy attacks have been reported in which weapons have
been used while 889 crew members have been taken hostage, 11 crew members
have been killed and 21 never found and are presumed dead (International Maritime
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Bureau, 2008). Along the coast of Somalia 42 vessels have been hijacked and 242
crews members have taken hostage for ransom. However, piracy in the maritime
Asia has declined with only 26 incidents in Indonesia, six in Singapore straights and
two in Malacca straights (International Maritime Bureau, 2008). The decline in the
region of Indonesia can also be explained due to the disastrous Tsunami of 2004;
pirates haven’t developed yet a sufficient network to support frequent piracy attacks
(Moller, 2009). Figure 5 depicts locations of piracy incidents that account for more
than two thirds of the global reported piracy attacks. Table 1 Shows the Actual and
Attempted piracy attacks along the MSR reported from 2003 to 2008.

Table 1- Annual Actual and Attempted Piracy Attacks along the MSR
Location
Maritime Silk Road

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

China/HK/Macau
Indonesia
Singapore Str.
Malaysia
Burma
Malacca Str.
Thailand
India
Sri Lanka
Bangladesh
Gulf of Aden
Somalia
Kenya
Eritrea
Total

1
121
2
5
28
2
27
2
58
18
3
1
268

3
94
8
9
1
38
4
15

4
79
7
3
12
1
15
21
10
35
187

43
3
9
7
2
11
4
15
13
31
4
1
143

28
6
10
1
2

17
8
2
1
1
201

1
50
5
10
11
1
5
1
47
10
10
151

10
1
12
92
19
2
183

Source: Drawn by the Author © Petroskelaiditis WMU-SMU, (ITL 09) ICC based on
International Maritime Bureau, (2008). Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships.
Annual report, UK: ICC. http://www.icc-ccs.org (requested via e-mail)

2.3 Factors that Fuel Piracy
There is no doubt that the main motive for the development of piracy is the
economic gain combined with the low risk which usually accompanies such criminal
acts; however, incidents that have taken place in different regions of the world
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reveal the fact many factors and variables exists for the development of piracy
(Pettreto, 2008). According to Daniel (2000) the end World War II decreased the
ocean security patrol while the decolonization of many regions around the world
created political instability of former colonies. Year’s later containerization and
globalization will fuel global trade and seaborne transportation. According to United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Review of Maritime Transport,
(2008) in 2007 the Europe-Asia lane overtook transpacific lane with 27.7 million
tones, almost 17.7 million more than year 2005, while traffic moving East increased
by 9.0 per cent reaching 10 million tones of goods carried by sea along the
traditional Maritime Silk Road through Malacca Straights and the Gulf of Aden. The
increasing volume of cargo carried by sea along the MSR combined with the
expansion of the international merchant fleet in order to meet the high demand of
international trade is one of the main factors that fuel the development of piracy.
Figure 6 depicts the type of products carried by sea from 1968 to 2008 in billion
tones per mile while figure 7 shows the expansion of the world merchant fleet from
1980 to 2008, in terms of dead weight.

Figure 6- Types of Cargo Carried By Sea in Billion Tones per Mile
Source: International Champer of Shipping, (2008) Shipping and World Trade.
UK, ICS
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Figure 7- International Merchant Fleet Expansion
Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, (2008). Review of
maritime Transport. NY & Genova: UN.

2.3.1 Expensive Vessels and Cargos
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Figure 8-Type of Ships Attacked in 2008
Source: Drawn by the Author © Petroskelaiditis WMU-SMU, (ITL 09)

For the transportation of the increasing volumes of cargo sailing from East to West
and vice versa new high tech and sophisticated vessels have been built to satisfy
the need of trade and of course to meet the demand for highly responsive maritime
transportation services, totally harmonized with the rhythm of logistics networks
around the world. Over 80% of the global trade is moving through the Gulf of Aden
while more than 60,000 ships carry 25% of the global trade through Malacca Str.
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Tankers loaded with millions of barrels of crude oil, containers stacked with
thousands of standardized containers loaded with high value cargo and chemical
tankers carrying expensive, and dangerous are definitely easy and amazingly
profitable targets for pirates. Ship-owners rather pay the amount of ransoms
required from pirates than take the risk of loosing the crew and the ship alike or
taking the risk of an environmental disaster (Reyes, 2008a). However, in most cases
pirates will escape with the ship’s expensive equipment and crew’s personal
belongings that afterwards will be sold to neighboring countries or used for a pirate’s
future attacks. Figure 8 show that the most favorable to pirate’s type of vessel is the
container, bulk carrier and chemical tankers.

2.3.2 Geography
The increased traffic between Europe and The East along the MSR in relation to the
use of “chock points” 6 increases the possibilities of piracy attacks (Sakhuja, 2006).
When the vessel approaches such “Chock Points” and needs to decrease the speed
to be more maneuverable, it at the same time becomes an easy target for pirates.
Coastal nations along the trade route between Europe and Asia with broad
coastlines: such as Somalia, Bangladesh, Malaysia and India give a tempting
opportunity to individuals to attack ships that sail along the coastal nations. Finally,
nations with complexes of islands such as Indonesia and Malaysia will provide the
most appropriate environment for pirates to exercise violent acts at sea, and
activities such as smuggling, drug dealing and other illegal activities. The above
mentioned islands will be the perfect place for pirates to hide and organize the next
attack.

6 Choke Point is narrow passage of a maritime trade route such as Malacca Straights and Gulf of
Aden.
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3.3 Failed Nation State
The increased traffic of trade lanes combined with the political instability and lack of
governments to secure and control their sovereign territories is another factor that
fuels piracy (Graham, 2006). People of Coastal-States with serious political
instability like Somalia and absent of law enforcement agencies are more likely to
slide into piracy (Murphy, 2007). However, this is not always the case, according to
Burnet (2002, pp 227) piracy is not always a local organized act; but instead can be
organized under the umbrella of organizations in relatively more political stable
nations due to the need to know information such as ship destination, number of
crew members and volume of cargo loaded. This information usually derives from
military, police, port state control officers. The absent of law enforcement power in
Somalia gives the tempting opportunity for pirates to organize and execute piracy
attacks against ships of any type (Lehr & Lehman, 2006). In the case of Somalia
piracy has turned to be more complicated and in favor of pirates. Hunter, (2008) in
his article, “How to pay pirate’s ransoms” states that pirates are getting stronger and
stronger day by day. The amount of money they gain from ransoms, compared to
the standards of life in Somalia, is enormously higher giving them the opportunity to
buy guns, expensive houses, and corrupt local authorities strengthening their social
profiles (Reyes, 2008b). In the end piracy will become a socially acceptable
profitable business and will spread along the coast of Somalia and even to neighbor
coastal nations of Africa that also face problems of political instability.

2.3.4 Poverty
Poverty in very simple words describes the living standards in terms of wealth,
health and economic development of a nation. Despite the development of maritime
transportation and global trade resulting from globalization there is still an imbalance
between the countries that have actually benefited from the globalized economic era.
According to the United Nations, “growing number of poor countries plunged into
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food crises by soaring prices”, (2007) forty countries face food crisis due to the
increased price of food commodities and oil. Figure 9 shows the purchasing power
of the world’s population. The first column depicts the fact that 86% of world’s
population can actually spend 1 dollar per day while for the rest 14% is not
economically feasible. When the daily amount of money is increasing, the
purchasing power decreases to a level where only 20% of the population can
actually spend $10 per day. According to World Bank’s indicators 42% of the global
population, which is equal to 2.6 Billion people, live in poverty. Petretto, (2008)
states that the economic gain combined with the low risk that follows a piracy attack
with no existence of defensive equipment on board the vessel, is definitely the main
factor that actually promotes piracy combined with the level of poverty in some
nations along the MSR. In terms of international trade Africa accounts for 13 per
cent of the world’s population but only 3 percent of global trade while the European
Union counts as 7.4 percent of world population but contributes 18 per cent of the
world's merchandised goods and 25 percent of its commercial services (United
Nations, 2007). The above mentioned instability in terms of wealth, the continuous
expansion of the merchant fleet, the volume of commodities carried by sea in
relation to the current global financial crisis, followed by the slow responsiveness of
the developed countries to solve the problem of poverty in developing countries,
individuals are easily tempted to resort to and exercise the most ancient criminal act
of violence at sea, Piracy (Pettreto, 2008).
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Chapter 3 Economic Impact of Piracy

3.1 Impact of Piracy on the Shipping Industry
According to the Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore, (2009) approximately
50,000 vessels pass every year from the Malacca and Singapore Straights carrying
a third of the global trade and almost half of the crude oil supplies (Bateman, 2007).
On the other hand, Suez Canal Authority’s vessel traffic statistics for 2008 states a
number of 21,415 vessels to have passed through the Gulf of Aden and Suez Canal,
heading to Europe and Asia, carrying a 7% of the global oil supplies and 7% of the
global seaborne trade. IMB (2008) reported 42 actual and 39 attempted attacks in
Somalia and Golf of Aden for the year 2008 which actually means that one out of
every 261 transits would be involved in piracy attacks while one out of 509 transits
would end in the hijacking of a vessel (Van Der Meijden, 2008). The economic
impact for the shipping company in terms of ransom, damages caused during the
attack and delays will be enormous. However, experts have estimated that costs of
piracy are approximately $16 billion per year and keep on arguing that such costs -in
a $7.8 trillion industry- are negligible (Van Der Meijden, 2008). Table 2 shows the
actual and attempted piracy attacks along the MSR for the year 2008. The
information of this table derives from an original table in the annual statistical report
of ICC- International Maritime Bureau and for the purposes of the present thesis has
been edited to present only information on piracy attacks along the MSR. A total of
183 piracy attacks have taken place along coastal nations of the Maritime Silk Road.
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Table 2- MSR Actual & Attempted Piracy Attacks for 2008
Location
Actual
Attempted
Maritime Silk Road
Indonesia
Singapore Str.
Malaysia
Burma
Malacca Str.
Thailand
India
Sri Lanka
Bangladesh
Gulf of Aden
Somalia
Kenya
Total

26
5
10
9
12
34
10
106

2
1
1
2
1
1
58
9
2
77

Source: Drawn by the Author © Petroskelaiditis WMU-SMU, (ITL 09) inspired by ICC,
International Maritime Bureau, (2008). Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships. Annual
report, UK: ICC. http://www.icc-ccs.org (requested via e-mail)

According to Van Der Meijden (2008) the economic impacts of piracy can be direct
or indirect. Direct piracy costs are those caused by the interaction of the ship with
pirates during an actual or attempted piracy attack while indirect costs consist of the
expenses that arise from the consequences of a piracy situation: higher insurance
premiums, legal fees, delays of cargo and increasing operational cost.

3.1.1 Direct Economic Impact

3.1.1.1 Ship and Cargo Damages
Recently pirates have been more ruthless than even before and they wouldn’t
hesitate to use any available weapon against the ship. Rocket-propelled grenades 7
and guns of every type are the most common means with which pirates force the

7 Hand held-shoulder launched anti tank weapons capable of firing rockets with explosive warhead,
Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rocket_propelled_grenade
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vessel to decelerate in order to be more vulnerable (International Champer of
Commerce, 2008). Even if the piracy attack is unsuccessful the hull of the ship,
accommodation satellite navigation and communication equipment, containers
loaded with sensitive cargos or even corrosive substances are exposed to
disastrous rockets and bullets. Damages caused by armed piracy attacks have been
estimated between $10,000 and $50,000 per attack (Van Der Meijden, 2008). In
2008, 183 actual and attempted piracy attacks have taken place along the MSR.
Damages of $30,000 per attack could cause financial loss of $5,490 Millions per
year.
•

Actual and Attempted Attacks* Average Loss per Attack= 5,490 Millions

3.1.1.2 Robbery of Cash and Crew’s Personal Belongings
In most cases pirates will not waist their time searching for high value importable
equipment but will go direct for ship’s cash in Captain’s cabin and look for crew’s
high value personal belongings such as mobile phones, digital cameras, portable
computers, jewelry, cash and other valuable things. In a 23 crew container vessel
and with almost every crew member having a computer and cash, the estimated
value of the stolen items is estimated between $4,000 and $20,000, per incident,
including Captain’s cash for ship’s operational issues. According to Table 2 106
actual piracy attacks have taken place in 2008 along the MSR. If the average
number of crew, of every of the above mentioned 106 vessels, is of 15 persons with
personal belongings of $2,000 per person and ship’s cash of $10,000 per vessel the
total financial loss is equal to $1,272 million.
•

Actual Piracy Attacks*Average Crew Number*Personal Belongings
($)*Captain’s Cash ($) = 106*15*2,000*10,000= $1,272 million.

3.1.1.3 Cargo and Ship Loss
It is not uncommon that pirates attack a container vessel and go after a specific
container loaded with high value electronic items or equipment. The very fact of the
cooperation between pirates and state port control or military officers who reveal
information such as position of the container, cargo loaded, destination and crew
number demonstrates that pirates have found and secured a way to develop such a
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network to ensure the longevity of their business. According to Clarkson’s Monthly
Intelligence Report, October 2008, the price of a five-year-old “panamax 8 ” container
vessel of 3,500 TEU’s in 2007 was $64 million, carrying loaded standardized
containers, consisting of low and high value cargos, of approximately $800 million
(Munich Re Group, 2006). Hijacking of the vessel with her cargo will have an
enormous economic impact on every part involved in the transportation and in the
supply chain of the goods. We assume one 5,000 TEU container vessel full loaded
to be lost with her whole cargo. The financial loss will be an average of $500 million.

3.1.1.4 Off-Hire and Investigations
Hill, (2003) in his book Lloyd’s Practical Shipping Guides, Maritime Law, defines “offhire”, under the New York Produce Exchange clause 15, as:

The event of the loss of time from deficiency of men or stores, fire, breakdown
or damages to hull machinery or equipment, grounding, detention by average
accidents to ship or cargo, dry-docking for the purpose of preventing the full
working of the vessel, the payment of hire shall cease for the time thereby lost;
and upon the voyage the speed be reduced by defect in or breakdown of any
part of her hull, machinery or equipment, the time so lost, and thereof, and all
extra expenses shall be deducted from the hire. (p. 181)
Investigations that will follow, incidents of piracy attacks, are conducted by
authorities in probably not very organized and politically unstable nations leading to
loss freight payment for which the ship-owners will provide transportation services.
According to Clarkson’s Monthly Intelligence Report October 2008 the daily average
earnings of a 3,500 TEU “panamax” container vessel, for 2008, are approximately
$30,000 per day. Bureaucratic investigations lasting one to two weeks could cause
enormous financial loss, due to off-hire, in terms freight payment, estimated to be
between $210,000 and $630,000 per one or two weeks. Assuming investigations of
3 days for only the actual 49 attacks of container vessels that have been reported by

8 Panamax is the type of vessel with the maximum dimensions that will fit through the locks of the
Panama Canal. Wikipedia. (2009). http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panamax
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the (IMB, 2008), with average daily earnings of $25,000, the total cost for these
three-day-investigations of the 49 attacked container vessels will be around $3,675
million.

•

49 Container Actual Attacks*Average daily earning *3 days
investigations=3,675 million.

3.1.1.5 Ransoms.
Kidnapping the crew of the vessel for ransom has been a very profitable business
for Somalian Pirates the last three years. Pirates will not hesitate to kill the crew and
keep the whole vessel and its cargo, in case their requirements for ransoms are not
fulfilled. According to several newspaper articles and taking into consideration the
case of the ‘Sirius Star’ tanker vessel that was finally released after the payment of
$3 million in ransoms, we can estimate the average rate for ransom settlement at
around $2 million per incident (Rice, 2009). According to Beal, (2008) ransoms that
have been paid can vary between $1 and $8 million while ransoms requested can
exceed $25 million. Figure 10 depicts the number of crew members taken hostage
and kidnapped for ransoms from 2003 to 2008.
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Figure 10- Grew Members Taken Hostage and Kidnapped for Ransoms
Source: ICC, International Maritime Bureau, (2008). Piracy and Armed Robbery against
Ships. Annual report, UK: ICC. http://www.icc-ccs.org (requested via e-mail)

What is more, negotiators for ransom settlements as well as means of transportation
via which ransoms will be delivered to pirates also add a small but not negligible
amount of money that can vary between $100 and $150 thousands (Hunter, 2008).
Lawyers will receive an average fee of around $200,000 for legal issues during the
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negotiation per piracy attack. With an average of $1.5 million paid for ransoms per
incident of kidnapping, the above 42 cases of kidnappings will result to $63 million of
loss, excluding the approximately $6.3 million paid for negotiators, $8.4 million for
lawyers and $4.2 million for security companies that delivered the ransoms to the
pirates. $150,000 for average fees for negotiators, $200,000 for lawyers and
$100,000 for security companies per attack are assumed; a total of $81,900 million
42 for kidnapping incidents.

•
Incidents of Kidnapping*Ransoms Paid*Fees (Negotiators +Lawyers
+Security Co) = 42*$1.5 million*$(150,000+200,000+100,000) =$81,900 million.

3.1.2 Indirect Economic Impact

3.1.2.1 Anti-Piracy measures
When the vessel sails through dangerous waters it is obliged to operate at the
highest requirements, level 3, of the International Ship and Port Security code (ISPS
code) which was introduced on July 1, 2004 in response to the 9/11 terrorist attack
in the United States. The implementation of the code is through chapter XI-2
“Special measures to enhance maritime security” in the International Convention for
the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, IMO, (2004). According to SOLAS (2004), Level 3
has been defined as:
The level applying for the period of time when there is the probable or imminent
risk of a security incident. Security level 3 means the level for which further
specific protective security measures shall be maintained for a limited period of
time when a security incident is probable or imminent, although it may not be
possible to identify the specific target. (Chapter XI-2)
Operation at level 3 requires additional measurements to be adopted in order to
avoid potential piracy attacks. The shipping industry and companies dealing with
security issues have introduced several technologies as solution to piracy. The use
of an electric fence around the vessel that will actually prevent pirates from boarding
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the vessel is one of the innovating and expensive -$35,000- technologies that have
been introduced so far. Night-vision cameras and binoculars that can actually
identify pirates in the dark based on the temperature of their bodies, cost between
$600 and $1000.

The Acoustic Defense System (LRAD) has the ability to transmit an effective high
intensity sound that can be used to prevent an approaching piracy attack. The price
for one LRAD is between $20,000 and $30,000. For the 71,415 vessels sailing the
waters of the Gulf of Aden and the Malacca straights, the purchase of the above
mentioned devise with an average price of $25,000 will cost $1.7 billion. On the
other hand, the hire of security companies that will provide vessels with air and sea
surveillance, using helicopters and high speed boats, as well as armed trained
guards to accompany the vessel while sailing through high risk waters is becoming
very common. The estimated price of the above mentioned private companies
exceeds $10,000 per day. Lloyd’s Shipping Economist (2002) mentioned prices of
such private security companies between 12,000 and 24,000 for only three and five
days. Finally, satellite tracking systems that can transmit emergency signals and the
exact position of the vessel to the shipping company and alert the authorities by
pressing only one button will cost approximately $400 per day (Van Der Meijden,
2008). A total of $3 billion is assumed to be spent on anti-piracy equipment, security
companies and satellite tracking system.

3.1.2.2 Increasing Insurance Premiums
The increasing insurance premiums for vessels sailing through the Gulf of Aden,
Somalia and the Malacca Straights reveal the responsiveness of the maritime
insurance industry towards frequent piracy attacks. Marine underwriters 9 are aware
of the danger and great risk in terms of Hull and Machinery (H&M) and Protection
and Indemnity (P&I) issues. However, with more and more frequent piracy attacks

9 According to Gold, E., Chircop, A., & Kindred, H. (2003). cf reference list, Underwriter is defined
the employee of that insurance company who is authorized to bind the company on insurance risks.
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underwriters will have to increase the insurance premiums to maintain the
profitability of their business but at the same time to provide the relevant acceptable
amount of compensations to the ship-owners. According to (Van Der Meijden, 2008)
apart from H&M or P&I issues an insurance company will provide compensation for
ransoms/kidnapping and off-hire/operational loss. Insurance companies under the
increasing numbers of piracy attacks will not be able to cover such financial loss
with only H&M and P&I insurance premiums. Frank, (2008a) has mentioned that
insuring a voyage against kidnapping for ransoms could cost around $16,000 per
voyage for the area of the Gulf of Aden and $5,500 per voyage for navigation
through the Malacca Straights. With 21,145 vessels sailing through the Gulf of Aden
and 50,000 vessels through Malacca straights shipping industry will suffer of
approximately $613 million per year.
3.1.2.3 Seafarers Double Pay
Sailing through high risk zones like Gulf of Aden and Malacca straights expose
crews’ lives at a great risk. Injuries, deaths, assassinations, man overboard
situations and missing crew members have been reported in most cases of actual or
attempted piracy attacks. The working environment on board the vessel is already
difficult enough and the threat of piracy imposes additional pressure on the crew.
Unpredictable pirates and crew’s feeling of helplessness followed by the slow
ransom negotiation process will have a great impact on crew’s lives in terms of
psychological concerns. According to BIMCO, Manpower 2005 Updated, (2005) by
the year 2015 the shipping industry will have to deal with a 27,000 of officers’
shortage despite the 44% of seaborne trade development that UNCTAD has
estimated for the year 2020. The already existing problem of officers’ shortage
combined with the frequent piracy attacks it will but attract new young workers to
begin a career at sea. Table 3 shows the crew shortage rates for the year 2000,
2005 and 2015. The less the available workers at sea, the higher the salary will be,
excluding the additional amount of money that the ship owner will pay for every
single crew member when the vessel sails though high risk waters. According to
calculations made by Van Der Meijden (2008) and Osler (2008), the additional wage
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cost for crew’s double payment has been estimated between $16 and $24 million
per year.

Table 3- Crew Shortage
2000
Crew
000s
%
Officers
-16
-3.3
Ratings
224
31

2005
000s
-10
135

%
-2.1
18.8

2015
000s
-27
167

%
-5.9
21.6

Source: Bimco, (2005). The world demand for and supply of seafarers. Manpower Updated
2000&2005.http://www.bimco.org/Corporate%20Area/Press/Releases/2005_12_02_Manpow
er2005update.aspx

3.1.2.4 Environmental Consequences
Although cases of pirates to cause voluntary cargo and ship damages or cases of
abandoning the vessels with none to navigate it, at an operational level, have not
been reported, the emerging nexus between piracy and maritime terrorism is of
great concern. Snodon (2006) mentioned that Al Qaeda seems to own a fleet of
vessels that can be used against ports or other ships around the world. Pirates
acting under the umbrella of international terrorist organizations can cause an
enormous environmental catastrophe and force major chokepoints such as the
Malacca Straights and the Gulf of Aden to close for a long period of time. The
impact on international trade and seaborne transportation could be uncountable
while the cost of the environmental damages will be immeasurable; 21,145 vessels
will be forced to sail around the Cape of Good Hope to reach destinations in Europe
and vice versa increasing the daily operational cost. On November 13, 2002 the
Liberian-flagged, single-hull tanker “Prestige” sunk off the Spanish coast of Galicia
spilling more than 20 million gallons of crude oil into the sea. The cost for cleaning
up the Spanish costs and the wreck of “Prestige” exceeded the amount of $4 billion;
such an incident in the Gulf of Aden could cause enormous environmental
catastrophe and financial loss.
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3.1.2.5 Alternative Trade Routes
According to Tibbetts (2008), the increasing piracy attacks in the Golf of Aden has
already forced strong players of seaborne transportation such as A.P. Moeller
Maersk and the Norwegian chemical shipping company Odfjell to divert their existing
tanker fleets and sail around the Cape of Good Hope in order to avoid piracy. Sailing
around South Africa means longer distance, increasing operating costs and as a
matter of fact increasing freight rates that will have a direct impact on consumers
(Fremont, 2007). The existence of highly sophisticated logistics and supply chain
networks brings out time as the most important factor for the global trade and
industrial expansion worldwide. Utilization of time and cost will actually determine
the shortest trade route to be followed by ships. Sailing around the Cape of Good
Hope is definitely not the best maritime trade route in terms of cost and time.
Vessels sailing around the Cape of Good Hope could add 5 to 21 days depending
on the port of destination and origin. According to Van Der Meijden (2008), ships will
have to sail an extra 3,500 nautical miles compared to the traditional route through
the Gulf of Aden thus increasing the cost between $350,000 and $950,000 per
transit. According to the Security Administration and Department of Transportation
of the US (n.d.), a vessel sailing from Saudi Arabia to North America will sail 2,700
nm more and lead to an additional operational cost and fuel consumption equal to
$3.5 million annually. However a container sailing from Europe to the Far East
around the Cape of Good Hope will lead to $74.4 million of additional fuel
consumption and $14.6 million for charter expenses. Assuming that out of the
21,415 vessels sailing through the Gulf of Aden 4,000 vessels sail around the Cape
of Good Hope with an additional $500,000 operational cost, shipping industry will
lose $2 billion. Table 4 provides the results of the average economic impact of
piracy on the shipping industry which is approximately $10.2 billion without taking
into consideration the impact on international trade and supply chains.
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Table 4- Summary of Economic Impact of Piracy
Direct Economic Impact
5,490,000
1,272,000
500,000,000
3,675,000
63,000,000
6,300,000
8,400,000
4,200,000
592,337,000

$/year
$/year
$/year
$/year
$/year
$/year
$/year
$/year
$/year

- Antipiracy measures
- Increasing Insurance Premium
- Seafarers Double Pay
- Environmental Issues (Prestige)
- Alternative Trade Routes

3,000,000,000
630,000,000
20,000,000
4,000,000,000
2,000,000,000

$/year
$/year
$/year
$/year
$/year

Total Indirect Economic Impact

9,650,000,000

$/year

Total Economic Impact

10,242,337,000

$/year

- Ship & Cargo Damages
- Crew Belongings & Cash
- Loss of Cargo & Ship
- Off-Hire (only for 49 Containers)
- Ransoms
-Negotiators
- Lawyers
- Security Companies
Total Direct Economic Impact
Indirect Economic Impact

Source: Drawn by the Author © Petroskelaiditis WMU-SMU, (ITL 09) inspired from van der
Meijden, (2008). Economic Influence of Modern Piracy on Maritime Commercial
Transport. Master Thesis, Erasmus University, 2008.

Adding to the aforementioned the rapid environmental changes, a great opportunity
is given to the shipping industry to explore the Arctic Ocean and develop a new
maritime trade route that will be as revolutionary as the opening of the Suez and
Panama Canal. A new trade, through the Arctic Ocean, could partly substitute the
traditional MSR saving distance and eliminating piracy’s financial losses and
potential terrorist attacks. Further investigation and evaluation of the use of the
Arctic Ocean for seaborne transportation follows in chapter four.
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Chapter 4
The Northern Sea Route (NSR)
4.1 Global Warming
Twenty years ago very few scientists could have predicted the environmental
changes that have been taking place in recent times. For most of the scientists
around the world the phenomenon of global warming is a result of the
“Anthropogenic Green House Gases” 10 that increase the average temperature of the
earth on an annual basis. Very optimistic climate models of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (2009) estimate that the global temperature during the
twenty first century will increase between 1.1 and 6.4 Celsius. The above mentioned
gases have been concentrated in the atmosphere of the earth and as a matter of
fact block the solar radiation that is reflected by the surface of the earth from
passing through the atmosphere and out to space. A part of the solar radiation will
remain in the atmosphere and be reflected back to the surface, warming up the
lower atmosphere and adding Celsius decrees in the global average temperature
(Dixon 2008). On the other hand the impact of the average temperature in the Arctic
is rising twice as fast as elsewhere on the planet. The ice is melting slowly but
steadily and decreases the surface of the Arctic Ocean that is actually responsible
for reflecting the solar radiation back to the atmosphere (Shalina, Johannessen &
Miles, 1999). The black color of the Arctic Ocean that is released from the ice
attracts and absorbs more solar radiation increasing the temperature of the sea
(Rodrigues 2008). With the ice melting so fast the idea of an ice free NSR is not just
looming on the horizon but is just around the corner. According to studies the ice in
the region of the Arctic Ocean is melting at the dramatic rate of 15% per decade
while the permanent annual ice has been reduced by 14% between the period of
1980 and 1998 (Nor Shipping, 2007). The most conservative models have predicted
that the Arctic Ocean will be completely ice free before the end of the century.

10 The greenhouse gases consist of carbon dioxide (76%), methane (13%), nitrous oxide (6%) and
fluorocarbons (5%), (Bloomberg, 2007)
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4.2 Geographical Morphology and Environment
As previously discussed in the literature review the Northern Sea Route can be
defined as a “national transportation route under full Russian control and jurisdiction,
stretching from the archipelago of Novaya Zemlya in the west to the Bering Strait in
the east” (Ostreng 2002 77). The NSR connects the European and Asian continents,
and passes through the seas of Barent, Kara, Laptev, East Siberian and Chukchi,
saving up to 50% of distance between Europe and Asia compared to the MSR.
Table 5 shows the distance-saving of a vessel sailing between Europe and Asia
using alternative maritime trade routes. The above mentioned five seas are
interspersed with islands that are located on the continental shelf of the Russian
mainland. Starting from west, the Barent Sea is separated from the Kara Sea by the
Novaya Zemlya island while the Kara Sea is separated from the Laptev Sea by
Sevemaya Zemlya island. Novosibirskye and Wrangel islands divide the Laptev,
East Siberian and Chukchi Seas and finally the NSR opens to the North Pacific
Ocean though the Bering Straight (Kitagawa 2001). Figure 11 shows the Northern
Sea Route stretching from Europe to Asia along the Russian continental shelf.
Table 5- Distance between Europe and Asia Using Alternative Routes
From Hamburg to:
Shipping Routes via: Yokohama
Hong Kong
Singapore
NSR

6920

8370

9730

Suez Canal

11073

9360

8377

Cape of Good Hope

14542

13109

11846

Panama Canal

12420

12920

15208

Source: Ranger, C, L., (2000). Northern Sea Route Cargo Flows & Infrastructure
Present State and Future Potential. The Fridtjof Nansen Institute. Norway.
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Figure 11-The Northern Sea Route
Source: Kitagawa, H. (2001). The Northern Sea Route: The Shortest Route Linking East
Asia and Europe. Tokyo: Ship and Ocean Foundation.

4.2.1 Depths
The NSR consists of a number of straits that link the five seas, with different
geographical and hydrographic morphology. Route selection will have to take into
account the possible combination of the straights through which the vessel will
navigate minimizing distance and operational cost. The depths of the seas are a
matter that should be taken into consideration. Even though the depths of the five
seas don’t restrict navigation along the NSR, this is not the case for the straights
that are located between the several islands and the Eurasian continent. Starting
form the five seas, the Barent Sea is more than 200m deep while the Kara Sea’s
depth is less than 100m. Moreover, the Laptev Sea depth is more than 1,000m and
the east Siberian is approximately 100m deep. Moving further east, Chukchi Sea is
only 50m deep (Ranger, 2000). Table 6 gives more details of the straits along the
NSR and their depths.

Table 6– Northern Sea Route Straights, Length and Depths
Straight Name
Length in
Breadth in

Depth in Meters

Nautical Miles NM

Nautical Miles NM

East (E)/West(W)

Yugorkiy Shar

21 NM

5.5 NM

E 13-15/ W 16-30

Kara Gate

18 NM

61 NM

Minimum 21 E/W
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Vilkitskiy

30 NM

Unrestricted

Unrestricted

Shokalskiy

80 NM

10 NM

Minimum 37 E/W

Dmitry Laptev

63 NM

30 NM

E 12-15/ W 14-18*

Sannikov

160 NM

16-18 NM

Minimum > 13

Long

120-160 NM

81 NM

Minimum 20-30

* Eastern approach has shallow waters of less than 10m restricting vessels of 6.7 drafts.
Source: Drawn by the Author © Petroskelaiditis WMU-SMU, (ITL 09)

4.2.2 Ice Condition
Apart from the shallow waters and numerous variations of depths of the five seas
and straights along the NSR, ice formation is another factor that imposes limitations
and exposes navigation and safety of life to several risks. The traditional navigating
season along the NSR, is during summer time when the five seas have the most
favorable ice conditions for navigation. Summer time has been defined as the
season between June and October when the five seas are partly ice-free with a 50%
of ice-covered waters and with relatively thinner ice (Kitagawa 2001). Conversely,
navigation during winter is definitely more difficult due to the rough environmental
conditions and thicker ice that covers almost every sea along the NSR, with the
exception of the Barent Sea some parts of which are ice-free even during the
toughest winter season (Breskin et al., 1998). Table 7 provides useful information
regarding the percentage of ice formation of the five seas along the NSR. During
summertime the most favorable month for navigation is June when the north-eastern
Kara Sea, Western Laptev Sea and the eastern pat of the East Siberian Sea are icefree.

Table 7- Sea Ice Extent during summertime
End
of Arctic Region
Month
S-W
N-E
West
East
Kara
Kara
Laptev
Laptev
Sea
Sea
Sea
Sea

S-W
Chukchi
Sea

East
Eastern
Siberian
Sea
0

27%

June

17%

0

10%

10%

West
Eastern
Siberian
Sea
0

July

40%

18%

24%

33%

10%

6%

57%

August

85%

41%

45%

69%

31%

17%

75%
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September 95%

53%

51%

80%

49%

27%

85%

Source: Kitagawa, H. (2001). The Northern Sea Route: The Shortest Route Linking East
Asia and Europe. Tokyo: Ship and Ocean Foundation.

4.3 Financial Performance Overview
The future development of the NSR depends on the profitability and financial
performance of a vessel operating along the NSR. According to Stopford (1997), for
a successful financial performance three factors need to be taken into consideration.
The revenue, the operation cost and the ways in which the ship-owner will finance
the business. The key to a successful operation is the optimal ship operation in
terms of costs and the “economies of scale 11 ”. Unfortunately, ship-owners can not
do much to influence the price they receive for their transportation services but by
increasing cargo capacity, decreasing ships turnaround time and running costs they
can ensure profitability in short and long terms.

4.3.1 Economies of Scale
The NSR can be used for the transportation of the Arctic’s natural resources and
also for transit cargoes between Asia and Europe and vice versa. Container ships
are the most appropriate ships to carry transit cargoes through the Arctic straights
between East and West. Compared to bulk carrier and tanker vessels the size of the
container vessels have not been optimized always in relation to the operating costs.
The relationship between ship’s size and cost is known as “Economies of Scale”.
According to Essallamy (2008), ship’s size, speed and utilization of cargo capacity
are some factors, the variable inputs of which can actually result in optimal
economies of scales and profit maximization. However, the point at which the added
value of inputs (speed, cargo capacity, size etc.) is not resulting in the same rate of
revenues, a diminishing return phenomenon appears the name of which is
“diseconomies of scale” (Ma, 2008). A diseconomy of scale, in simple words, means
the decline of revenues after a certain amount of inputs that have been added.
Figure 12 describes the behavior of ship’s costs in relation to the increasing ship’s

11 C.f Paragraph 4.4.1
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size. It is obvious that the more we increase the size of the vessel the more
profitable the operation of the vessel will be, therefore, at the point of 100,000 tons
of ship’s size, cargo and ship cost will interact reaching the optimal point. Further
increasing the size of the vessel, exceeding the 100,000 tons, the output will not
have the same rate and cargo and ship cost will start to increase.

Figure 12- Economies of Scale in terms of Ship’s Size
Source: Ma, S. (2008a). Maritime Economics. Unpublished Maritime Economics Handouts.
World Maritime University.

The question arising here is whether economies of scale can actually apply to
containers sailing along the NSR, taking always into consideration the constraints of
the geographical morphology of the Arctic Ocean in terms of draft. The shallow
waters of the five seas along the NSR in relation to the sea ice extent of the Arctic
Ocean impose several restrictions on the size of the vessel. Figure 13 shows the
decreasing expenses of a vessel when the size of the vessel increases.

Operating Cost
1200teu
2600teu

Port Charges

4000teu

Total Cost
0

20

40

60

80

100

120

Figure 13-The bigger the Vessel the less the Expenses
Source: Ma, S. (2008a). Maritime Economics. Unpublished Maritime Economics Handouts.
World Maritime University
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4.4 Case Study
This case study will estimate the expenses of a container vessel sailing along the
NSR and eventually will calculate the average cost for transporting one TEU.
According to Arpiainen & Kiili (2006), a double-acting vessel (DAV) of 5,000 TEUs
capacity is the most appropriate in terms of size and economy of scales for sailing
along the NSR. The case study is partly based on a project conducted by Aker
Arctic Technology Inc, in 2005, for the economic feasibility of the NSR using a 5,000
TEU container vessel, which was an improved version of the first arctic container
vessel, “Norilskiy Nickel”, built by Aker Shipyards for the Russian company Norilsk
Nickel. The 5,000 TEU Arctic container vessel, with a building cost of $295 million, is
281.3 meters long and 34.6 meters wide. The depth is 21.3 meters having an
acceptable -for sailing in the shallow Arctic waters- draft of 13.5 meters. The vessel
has eight cargo holds that can be loaded with twelve rows of containers with a
maximum height of eight containers per row. On the other hand, the deck of the
vessel can facilitate 14 rows of containers with a maximum height of seven
containers per row. The total capacity of the vessel is 5,000 TEU equal to 68,000
dwt (Figure 14). The vessel has two Azipod propulsion systems that can produce
power of 18MW each. When the vessel navigates in open waters can reach
maximum speed of 19 knots while navigating in thick ice of 2.4 cm the maximum
speed is 2.4 knots astern. Fuel consumption has been estimated to be 170 tones
per day.

Figure 14- 5,000 TEU Arctic Container Vessel
Source: Arpiainen, M & Kiili, R. (2006). Arctic shuttle container link from Alaska US to
Europe. Aker Arctic Technology Inc project, report K-63.

37

4.4.1 Route Selection
According to Arpiainen and Kiili (2006), the speed of a 5,000 TEU container vessel
will vary significantly due to the different environmental conditions and ice formation
along the NSR during the four seasons of the year. Arpiainen and Kiili (2006) based
on “Aker Arctic Technology Inc project, report K-63” assumed that the most
favorable months for navigation, in terms of speed and sailing days, are September
and October with average 11 days for one-way trip, between Europe and Asia and
19 knots sailing speed. The distance between the two ends of the NSR, Bering and
North Sea is approximately 4,963nm. For the case study we assume Hamburg and
Yokohama the two points of arrival and destination of the container vessel with 2
days spent at every port for loading and unloading process. Table 8 provides more
detailed information for the NSR in terms of optimal routes, length, ship’s navigating
time and speed.

Table 8- Speed variation and sailing times for different route

Source: Arpiainen, M & Kiili, R. (2006). Arctic shuttle container link from Alaska US to
Europe. Aker Arctic Technology Inc project, report K-63
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4.4.2 Cargo Transportation
Based on the assumption that the NSR is ice-free for two months we can now
calculate the monthly volume of containers transferred between East and West.
During the most favorable months, September and October, the vessel will complete
transit transportation in loaded condition in 522 hours or 22 days. During the above
mentioned 22 days the vessel will transfer 10,000 TEU containers. However, out of
the eight remaining days of the month, the vessel will remain at port for loading and
unloading operation for four days and another four at sea carrying approximately
1,805 TEU. As a matter of fact between September and October the vessel will
carry 23,610 TEU containers. The number of the TEU transferred for the rest of the
year is given in table 9 based on calculations conducted by Arpiainen & Kiili (2006).
A total of 102,278 TEUs will be transferred between Europe and Asia.

Table 9- Assumed TEUs Transported along the NSR

Source: Arpiainen, M & Kiili, R. (2006). Arctic shuttle container link from Alaska US to
Europe. Aker Arctic Technology Inc project, report K-63.

4.4.3 Structure of Vessel’s Costs
In order to calculate and estimate the cost for transporting on a container along the
NSR all the expenses related with the operation of a vessel need to be considered.
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According to Stopford (1997), the total cost of a vessel per dwt is the sum-up of the
operating, cargo handling and capital cost divided by the dwt of the vessel. However,
the purpose of this case study is to calculate the annual cost of a Double Acting
container Vessel (DAV) sailing along the NSR and to estimate the transportation
cost of one TEU per year. As a matter of fact the annual cost of a TEU is the sum-up
of the operating, voyage and capital cost of the vessel divided with total amount of
TEU transferred in one year. Table 10 shows the cost per TEU.
Table 10– Transportation Cost of One TEU
C/TEU

= OC/y+VC/y+K/y
T-TEU/y

C/TEU = cost per TEU transported per annum
OC
= operating cost per annum
VC
= voyage cost per annum
K
= capital cost per annum
T-TEU = total TEU transported in one year
y
= Year
Source: Drawn by the Author © Copy write Petroskelaiditis WMU-SMU,
(ITL 09), inspired by Stopford, M. (1997). Maritime Economics,
2nd Edition, UK: Routledge.

4.4.3.1 Operating Cost
The operating cost of the vessel consists of all the daily expenses of the vessel such
as crew cost, insurance, administration, repairs and maintenance. Table 11 provides
more details for the main components of the Operational cost of a vessel.
Table 11– Operational Cost per Year

OC/y=M/y+ST/y+MN/y+I/y+AD/y
M
ST
MN
I
AD
y

= Manning Cost
= Stores
= Repair-maintenance
= Insurance
= Administration
= Year

Source: Drawn by the Author © Petroskelaiditis WMU-SMU, (ITL 09),
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inspired by Stopford, M. (1997). Maritime Economics, 2nd Edition, UK:
Routledge.

Manning Cost. Manning cost consists of all the direct and indirect expenses of the
crew on board the vessel. For a container ship navigating along the NSR, expenses
such as salaries, insurance, pensions, airplane tickets for repatriation and other
miscellaneous expenses form the basic manning costs. The most appropriate
nationality of crews, in terms of experience, that can actual operate efficiently under
such extreme environmental conditions is the Russian. Assuming that a crew of
Russian nationality consists of eight officers (Captain, Chief mate, two 2nd officers,
Chief Engineer, 2nd Engineer, two 3rd engineers) of an average salary of $270,000
per year and thirteen ratings (bosun, four Abs, a catering staff of three, oiler,
electrician etc.) with an average salary of $200,000 per year, while miscellaneous
costs such as repatriation, health insurance etc. have been estimated at around
$7,619 per person or $100,000 per crew per year.

Stores and Consumables Costs Consist of spare parts, lubrication oil for the main
and auxiliary engines, consumable articles for the crew etc. Due to the sophisticated
design of a DAV and its unique functions use of lubricants of around $270,000 per
year is estimated while cabin stores and water are estimated to be approximately
$20,000 per year. Finally, spare parts and other miscellaneous stores cost $80,000
per year.

Repair and Maintenance Costs. Sailing along the NSR due to the extreme
environmental conditions and presence of ice extent in relation to high concentration
of dissolved oxygen accelerate the corrosion of steel structures thus producing the
need for the conduction of special and more frequent maintenance. On the other
hand, Breakdowns or failures of equipment can be very expensive depending on
how critical for the operation of a ship the equipment is. Breakdowns may lead to
shipyards or to expert repair services groups. Based on the maintenance costs used
by Kitagawa (2001), and adjusted to an annual currency inflation of about 2.49%, for
the last nine years, we can approximately estimate maintenance costs around
$320,000 and engine spare parts around $230,000 per year. Finally, annual
expenses of $500,000 for technical, inspection and dry docking issues should be
considered as well.

41

Insurance Costs consist of the Hull and Machinery (H&M) insurance and Protection
& Indemnity (P&I). Hull and Machinery insurance will protect the ship-owner from
any physical damages or loss while Protection and Indemnity will provide
compensation for third party liabilities such as oil pollution, damage to cargo,
collision damage etc. According to Stopford, the insurance cost of a vessel accounts
for an average 30% of the total operational cost of a vessel. Liu & Kronbak (2007)
have estimated, for 4,500 TEU container vessel, H&M costs of around $511,000 and
P&I costs of around $383,250 per year. However, for a 5,000 TEU container vessel
the author assumes an approximately cost of $375,000 for H&M and of $265,000 for
P&I per year. Despite the persistent efforts made by the author of this thesis to
acquire more accurate and exact figures, Russian insurance companies did not
reply to questions related to the insurance premium of a vessel sailing along the
NSR.

Administration Costs consist of management charges, communication charges
between charterers and ship-owners and other miscellaneous general costs when
the vessel operates at sea or at port. A daily rate of $700 is more than enough for
administrative issues including also charges for weather reports and accurate ice
formation predictions and route recommendations. According to Liu and Kronbak
(2007), one-day forecast costs around $90. Total administration cost can be
estimated to be around $260,000 per year.
4.4.3.2 Voyage Cost
Fuel consumption, NSR dues and port charges will determine the voyage cost of a
vessel sailing along the NSR. Table 12 depicts the main components that form the
voyage cost of a vessel.

Table 12– Voyage Costs
VC/y=FC/y+PD/y+TP/y+NSRD/y
VC
FC
PD
TP
NSRD

= Voyage Costs
= Fuel Costs
= Port Dues
= Tugs-Ice Pilot
= Northern Sea Route Dues
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y

= Year

Source: Drawn by the Author Drawn by the Author © Petroskelaiditis
WMU-SMU, (ITL 09) inspired by Stopford, M. (1997).
Maritime Economics, 2nd Edition, UK: Routledge.

Fuel Costs. The daily fuel consumption of the DAV container vessel is approximately
170 tones per day with 35 WM shaft power. The total one-way sailing time of the
vessel is 5,143 hours or 214 days per year. The vessel will spend 4 days at port, or
96 hours for every one-way trip, which is equal to 48 days per year. One year oneway trip is equal to 262 days. The rest of 103 days will be spent at sea and as a
matter of fact the total sailing time of the vessel is equal to 7,615 hours or 317 days.
The total annually fuel consumption is equal to 53,890 tons. Despite the decrease of
the crude oil price due to the current financial crisis the author assumes the price of
fuel oil to be $300 per ton. As a matter of fact annual fuel consumption is equal to
$16 million including the consumption of fuel consumed by auxiliary machineries
and generators.

Port Charges. Transportation of cargo between Asia and Europe can link Yokohama,
Japan and Hamburg, Germany. Kamesaki, Kishi & Yamauchi (1999) concluded that
by producing the INSROP working paper No. 164 the amounts of $113,000 of port
charges for Hamburg and $59,000 for Yokohama for six days are spent at each port.
By adjusting a 2.52% of currency inflation for the last nine years we can estimate
that for a “panamax” container vessel at the port of Hamburg the charges would be
approximately $60,000 for two days while $30,000 for two days in Yokohama. The
vessel would spend 24 days at each port every year and the total port charges
would be $720,000 for Hamburg and $360,000 for Yokohama per year.

Ice Pilot Chares. Sailing along the NSR would definitely require the experience of
the Russian ice pilots to guide the vessel through the narrow straights and ice
covered waters. According to Liu & Kronbak (2007), the rate of such pilots is $1 per
nautical mile. For 24 hours of navigation two pilots are needed with an average cost
of approximately $7,000 per one-way trip or $80,000 per year.
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NSR Dues. All vessels sailing along the NSR for transit or regional seaborne
transportation need to pay the transit fees for the maintenance of the NSR
infrastructure and ice breakers. According to Ranger (2000), NSR fees depend on
vessel’s ice clause, gross tonnage, nationality and season during which the vessel
will sail along the NSR. However the construction of DA vessels with ice breaking
capabilities will eliminate the need for icebreakers which is the main component of
the NSR fees. As we can see from figure 15 in the year 1985 approximately six
millions of bulk cargo was transferred along the NSR with an average NSR fee of $3
USD per ton. In 1995 the average cargo transferred along the NSR was 3 millions
less than in 1985 with an average NSR fee of $7.5 per ton. Therefore it is obvious
that the more cargo is transferred along the NSR the less NSR fees the ship-owners
will pay.

Liu & Kronbak (2007) mentioned that since one TEU is equal to 24 tons and based
on the current charge of $40.8 per tone one container TEU will cost approximately
$979 which is extremely high especially for a 5,000 TEU container vessel. However,
Russia needs to develop NSR fee charges independent of icebreakers use. Ranger
(2000) has mentioned that NSR fees in the future will not exceed $5 per gross
tonnage which could be a transit rate competitive enough without the need for ice
breakers. A “Panamax” container vessel of 32,000 gross tonnage costs $160,000 in
transit fees to ship-owners for a one-way trip. If a “Panamax” container can conduct
five transit trips per year the total charge for the NSR dues will be $1,600 million.
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Figure 15– NSR fees through the Years
Source: Liu & Kronbak, (2007). The economic potential of using northern sea route (NSR)
as an alternative route between Asia and Europe.

4.4.3.3 Capital Cost
Based on the information provided by Aker Arctic Technology the building price of a
DAV 5,000 TEU container vessel is equal to $295 million, financed by bank loan to
be paid back in 20 years in equal annual installments of $14,750 million per year
and with an annual interest rate of 8% of the outstanding loan. The capital cost per
year will be $19,861 million (Arpiainen & Kiili, 2006).

4.4.4 Total Arctic Transportation Cost
According to the above mentioned assumption and formulas the average cost for
transporting one container TEU between Europe and Asia can now be calculated.
Table 13 is a summary of all the assumptions related to operational, voyage and
capital cost of the vessel.

Table 13– Summary of Operational, Voyage and Capital costs
General Specifications
Panamax
Container Vessel
Ship Type
68,000
Deadweight
32,000
Gross Tonnage
TEU
5,000
Capacity
TEU/y
102,278
Cargo Transferred
Operating Cost
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Manning
-Officers
-Ratings
-Repatriation/Insurance etc.
Stores
-Lubricant Oil
-Cabin Stores
-Water Supply
-Miscellaneous
Repair & Maintenance
-Maintenance
-Engine/Deck Spare Parts
-Dry dock, Inspections
Insurance
-H&M
-P&I
Administration
Total Operating Cost

270,000
200,000
100,000

$/y
$/y
$/y

270,000
15,000
5000
80,000

$/y
$/y
$/y
$/y

320,000
230,000
500,000

$/y
$/y
$/y

375,000
265,000
260,000
2,890,000

$/y
$/y
$/y
$/y

317
170
300
53,890
16,000,000

days
Tons/day
$
Tons/year
$

720,000
320,000
80,000
1,600,000

$/berthing/year
$/berthing/berthing/year
$
5$/gross
tonnage
for
5transit trips per year

Total Voyage Cost

18,720,000

$

Capital Cost
-Building Price
-Interest Rate
Total Capital Cost

295,000,000
8
19,861,000

$
$
%
$/Per year

Total Cost

38,581,000

$/Per Year

Voyage Cost
-Sailing days
-Fuel Consumption
-Price
Total Fuel Consumption
Total Fuel Price
Port Charges
-Hamburg (24 days/year)
-Yokohama (24 days/year)
Ice-Pilot
NSR Dues/per year

Source: Drawn by the Author ©Copy write PetrosKelaiditis WMU-SMU, (ITL 09).

With average annual costs of approximately $38.5 million and with annual volume of
containers transported between Europe and Asia estimated at 102,278 TEU the
formula of table 9 can be applied to calculate the cost of transporting of one
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container between Europe and Asia through the NSR. As a result the transportation
cost of one container TEU along the NSR is equal to $377.

Chapter 5
Cost Comparison-Fuzzy Comprehensive Evaluation
Model for the NSR
5.1 Comparative Analysis of Piracy’s Economic Impact and
NSR Costs
The average annual transportation cost of a TEU using the NSR, between Europe
and Asia is equal to $377 compared to the transportation cost of a container using
the MSR, through the Malacca straights and the Suez Canal, which is approximately
$1,200 (Arpiainen & Kiili 2006). In addition, the estimated cost of piracy on the
shipping industry is approximately $10.2 billion excluding the impact of piracy on
international trade and supply chain networks due to cargo delays. With $10.2 billion
spent on piracy related issues, 27,055,702 TEUs could be transported between
European and Asian markets with direct benefits for the consumers in terms of lower
final product market prices.

The shipping industry is definitely a highly profitable industry; however $10.2 billion
should not be ignored. The capital cost for building a Double Acting container vessel,
of 5,000 TEUs capacity, is $295 million; the construction of 20 DAVs that will
operate all year long will cost $2.95 billion; a much lower sum than what the
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shipping industry spends on piracy incidents per year. Although the cost of piracy,
based on the economic analysis of chapter 3, has been estimated to be $10.2 billion,
some experts believe that the cost of piracy per year is approximately $16 billion
(Van der Meidjen 2008). If this is so, the substitution of the Maritime Silk Road,
along which piracy has always existed, could save a lot of money to ship-owners
and international trade. The cost of piracy along the NSR will be naught while the
possibilities of the maritime terrorist attack will be eliminated. Taking also into
consideration the continuous environmental changes and the melting of ice such a
scenario could be the case in the following years. Less traffic along the traditional
MSR will force inhabitants of coastal developing countries along the Maritime Silk
Road to find other means of making a living than exercising piracy.

5.2 Comprehensive Analyses of the NSR
The establishment of the International Northern Sea Route Program (INSROP), in
1993, with the cooperation of the Central Marine Research & Design Institute
(CMRDI) in Russia, The Fridtjof Nansen Institute (FNI) in Norway and Ship and
Ocean Foundation (SOF) in Japan was undoubtedly the first organized attempt to
investigate the economic potential of the NSR for seaborne transportation. Some
years later in 2003 the Arctic Operational Platform (ARCOP) project was established
to investigate if the transportation of oil and gas, through the NSR, was economically
and technologically feasible. 21 organizations and private institutions from the
European Union (EU), Russia Federation (RF) and Norway were involved in the
project. The comprehensive analysis of the NSR that will follow is based on the
conclusions of the above mentioned international programs.

5.2.1 NSR Policy and Legal Regime
The legal regime concerning the NSR in terms of national and international
legislation has sparked heated debates concerning the Russian national legislation,
which comes into conflict with international laws, raising strong objections -mainly on
the part of the USA. Russia’s territorial waters and exclusive economic zone
conform to the interpretation of the Article 3 of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of Sea (1982) according to which:
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Every State has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit
not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from baselines determined in
accordance with this Convention. (Part II, Section 2, Article 3)
As a matter of fact the above interpretation gives the legal right to Russia to observe
every activity of foreign vessels along the NSR. However, problems arise due to the
claims of the USA that the ice covered straights along the NSR are international
waters and transit passage should be a legal right of every vessel despite nationality.
From another point of view, Russia claims the NSR straits, as internal waters,
mainly based on the UNCLOS Article 234 which was adopted by the United Nations
in 1982 and ratified by Russia in 1997. Article 234 of the United Nations Convention
on the Law of Sea (1982) states that:

Coastal States have the right to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws and
regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from
vessels in ice-covered areas within the limits of the exclusive economic zone,
where particularly severe climatic conditions and the presence of ice covering
such areas for most of the year create obstructions or exceptional hazards to
navigation, and pollution of the marine environment could cause major harm to
or irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance. Such laws and regulations
shall have due regard to navigation and the protection and preservation of the
marine environment based on the best available scientific evidence. (Part III,
Section 8, Article 234)
However, the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), a coast state,
based on the UNCLOS Article 234, approved the “Regulations for navigation on the
seaway of the Northern Sea Route” in 1991 the purpose of which is to prevent
pollution and protect the natural environment of the Arctic region and ensure safe
navigation for the ships sailing along the NSR. All vessels willing to enter the NSR
need to ask for the Northern Sea Route Administration’s permission by submitting
an application for icebreakers assistance as well as to prove with relevant
documents or certificates that the vessel or shipping company has the appropriate
insurance contract with which the insurance company will cover liabilities in case of
environmental

pollution

(Gorshkovsky

1999).

Regulations

become

more

contradictive to the international laws and Article 234 of UNCLOS 1982 in terms of
innocent passage due to the legal right of Russia under which Russia can board,
suspend or even remove any vessel from the NSR if there are concerns regarding
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the safety of the vessel and crew due to extreme environmental conditions as well
as due to disobedience of the vessel to the national regulations. As a consequence
the requirements of the Article 234 of UNCLOS, for “innocent passage” and
“nondiscriminatory” policy of the coastal state towards foreign vessels, under
Russian national legislation are under further discussion (Brubaker & Ostreng, 1999).
While It is unknown whether Russia applies the same passage fees to national
vessels or not; at the same time the requirement for mandatory icebreakers escort
sounds completely unreasonable especially for vessels that have been built for
sailing in ice covered waters and have the ability to sail without the help of
icebreakers (Arctic Platform, 2003b).

5.2.1.1 World Trade Organization (WTO)
In the long term the legal regime of the NSR will be further adjusted to comply with
the international laws due to the willingness of the Russian Federation to join the
World Trade Organization (WTO) 12 . Although it is a matter of time for Russia to join
the WTO still more effort needs to be made on trade issues to convince the
European Union (EU) and United States of America that Russia is ready to accept,
adopt and apply new trade patterns and business practices according to the
demands and standards of the WTO and the globalised economy of the present
days (BBC, 2009). The change regarding the Russian national legislation that
governs the NSR will eventually become a reality as soon as Russia becomes a
member of the WTO and adopts the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS). The WTO established the GATS as a reaction to the fact that although the
service industry supports more than 60% of the global production and employment,
it is focused more on domestic than international levels, in terms of trade. Put simply,
service needs to be traded like every tangible product. Under GATS services can be
traded in the same way as tangible products within a reliable system of global
regulations and of non-discriminatory nature, fueling the economic activity and

12 WTO is the only international trade organization that deals with trade regulations between nations
that have joined it and fuels the continuous trade of products and services as well as imports and
exports of the country-members, c.f. WTO, (1994).
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promoting development. The Russian national legislation along the NSR will be
restricted by the WTO and GATS requirements.

5.2.2 Maritime Insurance
It is a fact that trade activities along the NSR over the years have not been adequate
for the establishment of a well structured insurance market while information, based
on which foreign insurance companies could have estimated and analyzed the cost
of insurance premium, has been restricted (Moon & Tukhfatullin 2003). Lack of
statistical reports and figures regarding the frequency of ships accidents and
damages, oil spills and ships’ loss obstruct the conduction of an adequate analysis
of the Russian insurance market and as a result foreign insurance companies can
not confidently determine the price of the insurance premium and insurance policies
to be applied while sailing along the NSR. According to Donner (2009), there are
many interests involved in the maritime transportation such as the vessel, cargo,
banks and freight payable for the transportation service provided. All the above
interests are exposed to a number of different risks that need to be covered by
different insurance policies 13 .

Traditionally insurance companies will never create insurance initiatives unless it is
demanded by the shipping market (Gold, Chircop & Kindred, 2003). As soon as ship
owners start sending their vessels through the NSR, the insurance market will react
to cover the need for insurance policies. However, even nowadays very few Russian
private insurance companies exist to insure vessels navigating through the NSR,
most of which in order to be more competitive and attract more costumers offer
insurance premiums at a very low rate. Offering low insurance premium is extremely
dangerous for insurance companies due to the fact that in order to bear the risk of
environmental pollution or ship loss the insurance company needs to reinsure a part
of the risk 14 . If the insurance premium is very low the reinsurer will refuse to share
the risk and consequently the insurance company will bear the whole risk itself. As
13 The most common insurances are the Hull & Machinery Insurance, the Cargo Insurance, the Third
Party Liabilities Insurance -such as Protection & Indemnity (P&I)- and Insurance of Miscellaneous
Risks.
14 Reinsure the risk means the insurance company to share the risk with another insurance company
called reinsurance.
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soon as regular transportation will be a reality along the NSR there is no doubt that
insurance market will react positively to service the demand for insurance along the
NSR.

5.2.3 Environmental Issues
The 5 million square miles of Arctic Ocean is probably one of the last places on the
planet that have remained almost untouched by human beings and hardly inhabited
for the last 20,000 years (Yakovlev, et al, 1999). With a maximum winter
temperature of -45o, its flora and fauna have been involved in physical adaptations
to ensure the longevity of the Arctic ecosystem which is characterized by low
species diversity (Borgerson, 2008).
5.2.3.1 Impact of commercial shipping along the NSR
In 1989 the crude oil tanker “Exxon Valdez” ran aground in Prince William Sound in
Alaska spilling more than 10.9 million gallons of crude oil into the water causing a
tremendous environmental disaster that even nowadays is considered to be a bad
precedent of potential future oil spill incidents for future shipping activities along the
NSR (Johnson, 2009). Shipping activities along the NSR expose the fragile
ecosystem of the Arctic Ocean to several risks always related to environmental
pollution. In a region with low levels of productivity and biodiversity such as the
Arctic ecosystem oil spill can be disastrous. The impact of a year-round navigation
along the NSR can be diverse depending on the pollution and disturbance of the
ecosystem caused by the operation of the vessel, its interaction with the
environment and human error accidents. Exhaust gases, sewage, garbage,
discharges of ballast water, fuel residues and anti-fouling paints are some pollutant
factors closely related to the daily operation of the vessel. As an example, the under
water structure of the vessel, sailing along the NSR, will provide habitat for arctic
marine organisms that will attach themselves to the hull and by growing will increase
the sea resistance of the ship as well as the fuel consumption leading to higher
operating costs. The use of anti-fouling paints will not allow the growth of such
organisms by releasing small quantities of Tributiltyn (TBT), a toxic substance that
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has been found to create abnormalities to several marine species such as snails
and oysters (Fremantle Ports, 2009).

5.2.3.2 International Conventions Wanted for the Arctic Ocean
It is surprising that although the Arctic Ocean in terms of size, environmental
morphology and ecosystem structure is similar to the Antarctic one and although
commercial shipping is taking place along the NSR since many years ago, it wasn’t
fortunate enough to get the international recognition as a “Special Area” (SA) under
the International Convention for the prevention of oil pollution by ships, MARPOL
73/78. MARPOL was adopted by the International Conference on Marine Pollution
convened by the IMO in 1973 and 5 years later it was modified by the protocol of
1978. MARPOL consists of five annexes that set the regulations for pollution
prevention at sea. Under the Convention, special sensitive environmental areas
have been determined to receive a higher level of protection. The Antarctic Ocean,
the North and Baltic Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Black Sea, the Mediterranean sea,
the Red sea, etc. have been recognized as SA under MARPOL 73/78. According to
MARPOL (1973/78):

Defines certain sea areas as "special areas" in which, for technical reasons
relating to their oceanographically and ecological condition and to their sea
traffic, the adoption of special mandatory methods for the prevention of sea
pollution is required ( Annexes I, II, V)
Lack of international regulations to govern the navigation along the NSR in terms of
environmental pollution may be very critical for the Arctic ecosystem. In 2002, under
the rapid environmental changes and due to the lack of international conventions
IMO (2002b) responded with the adoption of “Guidelines for Ships Operating in
Arctic Ice Covered Waters” recognizing the need for recommendatory provision for
ships sailing in the Arctic. According to the IMO (2002b) the purpose of the
guidelines is to:

Address those additional provisions deemed necessary for consideration beyond
existing requirements of the SOLAS Convention, in order to take into account
the climatic conditions of Arctic ice-covered waters and to meet appropriate
standards of maritime safety and pollution prevention. (Annex, p.2)
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The guidelines consist of five parts providing recommendations for Ship’s
Construction, Equipment, Operational and Environmental issues for vessels
navigating in the Arctic Ocean. Governments of coastal nations that are involved in
shipping activities need to ensure that all members involved in the shipping industry
such as ship-owners, ship designers, ship-builders and ship-repairers will be fully
aware of the guidelines on operating in Arctic ice-covered waters (IMO, 2002b).

5.2.4 Technical Issues
Navigation along the NSR, due to the extreme environmental conditions and due to
the ice covered Arctic Ocean, demands vessels with specialized hull structural
features and design in order to resist the enormous ice load. However, except for
hull structure other issues also need to be taken into consideration such as speed,
size and level of maneuverability (Arctic Platform 2003a).
5.2.4.1 Ice-Strengthened Vessels & Icebreakers.
When ships sail along the NSR, part of the ship’s hull interacts with sea ice, causing
damages that sometimes can lead to sinking. Navigation in the Arctic Ocean
requires vessels to ensure safety and optimal operation. The above mentioned
vessels can be classified as Ice-Strengthened and Icebreaking vessels. Although
there is no universal recognized definition for ice-strengthened and ice breaking
vessels we can distinguish them based on the structure of their hull and their ability
to break the ice or just resist it. An icebreaking vessel can sail along the NSR
regularly breaking the ice and assisting ice-strengthened vessels by opening a safe
passage for them. The hull of an ice-strengthened vessel will resist the pieces of ice
that have been broken by the icebreakers. Vessels with only ice-strengthened
capabilities sailing along the NSR will definitely need the assistance of the existing
expensive Russian icebreaking fleet and as a result no adequate profitability will be
achieved.
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5.2.4.2 Double Acting Vessels
Building vessels that can operate efficiently in both open and ice-covered waters
with breaking ice capabilities is definitely a challenge.

The above mentioned

structure optimization for operational efficiency, in both open and ice covered waters,
is based on the idea that a vessel will have the ability to provide an icebreaker’s
efficiency and optimal, open water, performance. The solution to this problem has
been found with the construction of the first Double Acting Vessel (DAV). The
concept of DAV is based on the idea that a vessel can operate astern in thick ice
and ahead in thin ice and open waters. The catalytic role for the Doubling Acting
development has the electric-podded propulsion devises “consisting of a transformer,
frequency converter and an electric motor” (Bergh & Hellden, 2007). The electric
motor which is located under the ship’s hull in a pod shaped body is used to convert
the electric power to mechanical with which the propeller will rotate (Figure 16). The
pod can rotate 360 degrees without the need of a steering system, providing the
vessel with a high degree of maneuverability due to the fact that the propulsion
system can turn in any direction.

Figure 16- Cross section electric podded propulsion devises
Source: Bergh, L & Hellden, U. (2007). Electrical Systems in Pod Propulsion.
MSc Thesis Chalmers University of Technology, 2007. Sweden Goteborg.

5.2.4.3 Information Technology
Ships design is not the only technological issue that needs to be taken into
consideration for navigation along the NSR. Infrastructure of Information Technology
that will support Search and Rescue operations, Arctic satellite communication,
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‘real-time’ ice observation that while determine the alternative routes through the five
seas of the Arctic Ocean, navigation aid, radio communication, weather forecasting
and ice-extent forecasting are some of the basic investments that will fuel the
development of the NSR in terms of IT. Under the extreme environmental conditions
of the Arctic Ocean flow of information should never be restricted and sufficient
communication between the mainland and vessels sailing along the NSR should be
maintained all year long.

5.3 Fuzzy Comprehensive Evaluation Model for the NSR
The development of the NSR is a relatively complicated project with many multinature and volatile factors that can influence the decision for the establishment of
the NSR. According to Wang, Ho and Chen (2007), different factors, indicators and
objectives will increase the uncertainty of the project while different people will judge
differently the importance of the factors that need to be considered for the potential
use of the NSR. This study introduces the Fuzzy Comprehensive Evaluation Method
(FCEM) in order to evaluate a rather small number of statistical reports that have
derived from a questionnaire regarding the importance of factors that will determine
the development of the NSR. According to Sun, Wu, Hao and Dai (2006), FCEM
quantifies the uncertain factors of the evaluation objects like the NSR by
establishing and evaluating fuzzy or uncertain secondary factors that will be
integrated by utilizing the “fuzzy variable principle”; finally a comprehensive decision
will be made. The main steps for the FCEM are the “factor set”, “weight set” and
“evaluation set” (Shang, 2006). Based on the comprehensive analysis of the NSR of
paragraph 5.2 and environmental description of paragraph 4.2 the most important
factors that can actually influence the development of the NSR -due to high levels of
uncertainty- are the Environment, Technology and Policies.
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5.3.1 Factors Set
The set of factors (U) for the NSR can be defined as: U= {u1, u2, u3...un} where ui (i=
1, 2, 3) stands for each factor that can be uncertain or not. The main set of factors
(U) for the NSR consists of Environmental, Technological and Policy factors. As a
result U= {Environment, Technology, Policy}. On the other hand, each factor (ui)
consists of three secondary level factors equal to

ui= {ui1, ui2, ui3...…uin} i= 1, 2, 3

where n is equal to the factor in which the secondary factor belongs to. For example
secondary level factors for factor u1 is equal to {u11, u21, u31} or Environment= {Ice,
Pollution, Draft}, Technology= {Ship Design, Icebreakers, IT} and Policy= {fees,
Laws, Politics}. Figure 17 depicts the first and secondary level factors of the factor
set (U) that influences the development of the NSR. Each first level factor consists
of three secondary level factors.

Set of Factors Influencing the development of the NSR

Environment

Ice

Pollution

Ship Design

Technology

Draft

Policy

Fees

Icebreakers

Laws

Politics

IT

Figure 17-Fuzzy comprehensive evaluation model for the NSR
Source: Source: Drawn by the Author ©Copy write PetrosKelaiditis WMU-SMU, (ITL 09).

5.3.2 Evaluation Set
The evaluation set V consists of all the various and possible results of the evaluation
process. Evaluation set V is equal to V= {v1, v2, v3} where vi (i=1, 2, 3.., n) defines
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the possible results of the evaluation. The evaluation set V of the factors that
influence the development of the NSR is equal to {v1, v2, v3} where:
v1= Important, v2= Less Important & v3= Not Important
Using a scale of 100 to describe the maximum result and weight of importance of
the evaluating factors, we can categorize v1, v2 and v3 into three levels based on the
importance of the possible results. As a mater of fact v1 has the maximum weight of
importance ranging between 100-67, while v2 is defined between 66-34; finally v3 is
defined between 33-0. More specifically:

V= {v1, v2, v3} or V= {Important, Less Important, Not Important} or V= (100, 66, 33)
If the final results of the comprehensive evaluation are between 67 and 100 then the
first and second level factors need to be taken seriously into consideration for the
development of the NSR due to the great influence they may impose on the final
decision.
5.3.2.1 Questionnaire and Statistical Report
Based on the allocation of first and second level factors that influence the
development of the NSR the author designed a questionnaire and sent it to ten
people in order to measure the level of importance of the different secondary factors
that form the factor set V. The receivers of the questionnaire had simply to allocate
the different secondary factors into three judgment levels of importance: important,
less important and not important. Table 14 shows a sample of the table which was
included in the questionnaire and filled by the evaluators. Table 14 also provides the
number of people who determined the level of importance for each of the secondary
level factors. As an example, eight people determined ice as an important
secondary level factor whiles only two as less important.
Table 14–Secondary Factors Allocation into Three Judgment Levels
Name
Environment

Ice
Draft
Pollution

Important
8
6
5

Judgment Level
Less Important
2
3
4

Not Important
0
1
1
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Fees
6
3
1
Legal
2
1
7
Political
3
5
2
Ship Design
4
5
1
Technical
Icebreaking
6
1
3
IT
6
4
0
Source: Source: Drawn by the Author ©Copy write PetrosKelaiditis WMU-SMU, (ITL 09).
Policy

Finally, normalization of the statistical results will help to express the number of
people who allocated the different secondary level factors into different judgment
levels in measurable value that will be used for the establishment of the single factor
matrix R. Assuming the total number of people who participated in the questionnaire
equal to one, then table 15 shows the number of people expressed in decimals.

Table 15- Normalization of the Results
Judgment Level
Important
Less Important
Not Important
Ice
0,8
0,2
0
Environment
Draft
0,6
0,3
0,1
Pollution
0,5
0,4
0,1
Fees
0,6
0,3
0,1
Policy
Legal
0,2
0,1
0,7
Political
0,3
0,5
0,2
Ship Design
0,4
0,5
0,1
Technical
Icebreaking
0,6
0,1
0,3
IT
0,6
0,4
0
Source: Source: Drawn by the Author ©Copy write PetrosKelaiditis WMU-SMU, (ITL 09)
Name

5.3.3 Weighting Set
The level of importance for every first level ui factor is not the same. For every factor
ui the author will set a weight ai (i=1,2,3…n) that will determine the level of
importance and form the weight set A. The weight set A will be equal to A= {a1, a2,
a3…an} where a1 has no negative value, a1>0. Based on the comprehensive analysis
of the NSR in paragraph 5.2 environmental issues are the most important that need
to be taken into consideration for the development of the NSR (Pharand, 1984). On
other hand policy issues although they raise several constraints for navigation along
the NSR, future adjustments will eliminate any restrictions and force Russian
national legislation to operate under the umbrella of international conventions
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(Brubaker & Ostreng, 1999). Finally, technical issues due to the continuous
technological development of aspects related to the Arctic Ocean will not raise any
limitations for the potential economic use of the NSR (Arpiainen & Kiili, 2006).
Based on the above mentioned and on experts opinion the author recognized the
environment as the most important factor and weighed it with 0.5 while policy and
technology with 0.3 and 0.2 respectively.
A = (a1, a

2

, a

3

)

a i , i = 1, 2 , 3
n

∑

a

i=1

i

= 1, n = 3

A = ( 0 .5

0 .3

0 .2 )

The second level factors weight set W consists of weights w1, w2, w3 or
W= {w1, w2, w3…wn} where wi (i=1,2,3…n) has been assigned by the author based
on the comprehensive analysis of the NSR in paragraph 5.2; wi has no negative
value since wi >0. For example the secondary factors of the environment (u1) such
as ice, pollution and draft have a weight value of w1= (0.6 0.2 0.2). While the
secondary factors of policy (u2) such as fees, legal and politics have a weight value
of w2= (0.5 0.3 0.2)
= (w1, w

W

2

, w

3

)

w i , i = 1, 2 , 3
n

∑

w

w

1

= ( 0 .6

w

2
3

i=1

w

i

= 1, n = 3
0 .2

0 .2 )

= ( 0 .5

0 .3

0 .2 )

= ( 0 .4

0 .2

0 .4 )

Figure 18 depicts the value of weight that has been determined by the author for
every first and second level factors of the FCEM based on the opinion of experts
regarding environmental, legal and technical issues that have been already
discussed.
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Factors Influence the development of the NSR

Environment (0.5)

Ice (0.6)

Pollution (0.2)

Technology (0.2)

Draft (0.2)

Ship Design
(0.4)

Policy (0.3)

Fees (0.5)

Icebreakers
(0.2)

Laws (0.3)

Politics (0.2)

IT
(0.4)

Figure 18-Weight for each level factor
Source: Source: Drawn by the Author ©Copy write PetrosKelaiditis WMU-SMU, (ITL 09)

5.3.4 Single Factor Fuzzy Evaluation
The next step is the establishment of the fuzzy relationship matrix R for the
evaluation of every single factor in the U factor set. The evaluation matrix derives
from the function Ri= (rij)nxm where rij (ij= 1, 2, 3) represents the membership grade of
secondary j factors in vi judgment level, (Sun, Wu, Hao & Dai, 2006, p2). For every
single first level factor three series of single evaluation sets exist equal to:

R1= (r11, r12, r13…r1n)
R2= (r21, r22, r23…r2n)
.
.
.

Rmn= (rm1, rm2…rmn)
While the single factor evaluation matrix is:

⎛ R1 ⎞
⎟
⎜
⎜ R2 ⎟
R= ⎜
=
M ⎟
⎟
⎜
⎜R ⎟
⎝ m⎠

r11
r21

r12
r22

M

M

rm1 rm 2

L r1n
L r2 n
M
M
L rmn
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The single factor matrix for each of the three factors environment, technology and
policy of the comprehensive analysis of the NSR have been defined as follows
based on the normalization of the evaluation data that have been determined by the
evaluators in table 17.

⎡0.8 0.2 0 ⎤
R1= ⎢⎢0.6 0.3 0.1⎥⎥
⎢⎣0.5 0.4 0.1⎥⎦

⎡0.6 0.3 0.1⎤
R2= ⎢⎢0.2 0.1 0.7⎥⎥
⎢⎣0.3 0.5 0.2⎥⎦

⎡0.4 0.5 0.1⎤
R3= ⎢⎢0.6 0.1 0.3⎥⎥
⎢⎣0.6 0.4 0 ⎥⎦

5.3.5 Evaluation Results of Secondary and First Level Factors
The evaluation result of the secondary level factors can be found with the below
function:
B= [Second Level Weighting Set (w1, w2, w3)]x[Second Level Factor Set(R1, R2, R3)]
B1=w1xR1 or B1= (0.7 0.26 0.04)
B2=w2xR2 or B2= (0.42 0.28 0.3)
B3=w3xR3 or B3= (0.52 0.38 0.1)
While the evaluation results of first level factors can be found with the below
function:
⎛ B1 ⎞
⎜ ⎟
⎜B ⎟
C= Weight Set A x ⎜ 2 ⎟ or C= (a1, a2, a3) x
M
⎜ ⎟
⎜B ⎟
⎝ m⎠

⎛ B1 ⎞
⎜ ⎟
⎜ B2 ⎟
⎜ M ⎟
⎜ ⎟
⎜B ⎟
⎝ m⎠

⎡ 0.7 0.26 0.04⎤
C= (0.5 0.3 0.2) x ⎢⎢0.42 0.28 0.3 ⎥⎥ or C= (0.58 0.29 0.13)
⎢⎣ 0.5 0.38 0.1 ⎥⎦
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5.3.6 Results of Fuzzy Comprehensive Evaluation Model for the
NSR
Finally the results of the comprehensive analysis derive from the evaluation results
of the first level factors multiplied by the evaluation set V= {v1, v2, v3} or V= (100, 66,
33).

As a result:
⎛ v1 ⎞
⎜ ⎟
⎜v ⎟
D= Cx ⎜ 2 ⎟
M
⎜ ⎟
⎜v ⎟
⎝ m⎠

⎡100⎤
or D= (0.58 0.29 0.13) x ⎢⎢ 66 ⎥⎥ gives D=81.43
⎢⎣ 33 ⎥⎦

In paragraph 3.2.2 setting of the Evaluation Set the author determined three levels
of judgment: important, less important and not important ranging of 100-67, 66-34
and 33-0 respectively. The result of the comprehensive analysis is equal to D=81,43
showing the fact that in peoples’ eyes the factors such as environment, policy and
technology are of great importance and need to be seriously considered before any
further development of the NSR. Factors such as environment, technology and
Policy increase the uncertainty of the NSR for seaborne transportation and as a
matter of fact need to be evaluated deeply. The results of the fuzzy evaluation
comprehension analyses depicts the importance for further consideration and
discussion of the factors that may have an impact on the future development of the
NSR for commercial purposes. However, with only exception the environment any
other factor in long terms will not impose any restrictions on NSR.
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Chapter 6 Conclusion
This thesis “Economic Approach of Piracy along the Maritime Silk Road and Cost
Analysis of the Northern Sea Route” investigates and evaluates the economic
impact of piracy on the shipping industry and analyzes the viability of the
implementation of the NSR as an alternative trade route. A case study of a 5,000
TEU container vessels sailing along the NSR has been conducted, based on the
assumption that the NSR during September and October is completely ice-free and
that the vessel can operate at ‘open water’ speed of 19 knots. However, the above
mentioned assumption will not be the reality in the short term, and the shipping
industry will have to wait a bit longer before they can utilize the NSR to its full
potential. The continuous environmental changes and the increasingly fast melting
of ice confirms the fact that a totally ice free NSR is just a matter of time. The
economic impact of piracy along the Maritime Silk Road has been estimated to be
around $10.2 billion including costs such as ship and cargo damages, robbery of
cash and crew’s personal belongings, cargo and ship loss, off-hire and
investigations, ransoms, anti-piracy measures, increasing insurance premiums,
seafarers double pay, environmental consequences and alternative trade routes
excluding the impact of piracy on international trade and supply chain.

The cost for the transit transportation of one TEU, along the Northern Sea Route,
has been estimated around $377; a sum competitive enough compared with the
transportation cost of one TEU along the Maritime Silk Road which, based on
market studies, has been estimated at around $1,200. Sailing along the NSR could
not only save money in terms of distance and fuel consumption but also eliminate
the financial loss the shipping industry suffers due to piracy incidents. Russia’s
attitude, in terms of national legislation, towards foreign vessels sailing along the
NSR needs to be further negotiated and considered. Nevertheless, the willingness
of Russia to become a member of the World Trade Organization and as a result to
adopt the “General Agreement on Trade in Service” will definitely change the current
policy of the Russian Federation regarding the management of the NSR. All the
costs related to the NSR will be restricted under the regulations of the WTO to be
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the same for every country-member, making the idea of a free of legal restrictions
NSR feasible.

The rather isolationist policy Russia has developed over the years towards western
countries -fueled by suspicions of foreign-flagged vessels brings out the present lack
of international conventions to govern seaborne transportation along the NSR.
Russia fears oil pollution that exposes the Arctic ecosystem to a great risk. However,
the fact that Russian national legislation has adopted the “Regulations for navigation
on the seaway of the Northern Sea Route” along with the IMO’s “Guidelines for
Ships operating in Arctic ice-covered waters” will eventually entice ship-owners of
foreign-flagged vessels to demand international safety and navigational standards to
use the alternative route of the NSR. The increasing traffic along the NSR will
impose further pressure on international conventions to adopt regulations, of
compulsory nature, for navigation along the NSR in safety of life and environmental
protection terms. Nevertheless the insurance premiums for a vessel sailing along
the NSR can not be estimated accurately due to the lack of transit transportation
between Europe and Asia. However, the marine insurance industry is reactive
towards the demands of the ship-owners and generally of the shipping industry.
Thus, apart from the high risk of a vessel sailing along the NSR due to current
environmental circumstances, there is no reason to restrict marine insurance
companies from providing ship-owners with competitive insurance premiums in the
future.

Finally, container vessels with the ability to operate in both open and ice-covered
seas will optimize the operational cost of the vessel all year long even during the
toughest months for navigation. DAVs or Double Acting Vessels provide opportunity
for the development of the NSR despite the very short navigation period between
June and October when the five seas are partially ice-free with only 50% water
covered in and thinner ice. Although, DAVs will not be able to navigate at an open
water speeds of 19knots the shipping industry can take full advantage of them by
letting them navigate along the NSR during the most favorable months for
navigation, and the rest of the year traversing along the traditional maritime trade
routes such as the Maritime Silk Road. The vessel will sail along the NSR during
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summer months and along the MSR during the winter. Alternating between the
seasons allows shipping companies to take full advantage of the NSR during prime
periods for navigation. With the current environmental conditions transportation of
containerized cargo through the NSR is not economically feasible. Tough
environmental conditions, thus delaying shipment arrival could add millions of
dollars to the operating cost of the vessel. However, the operational costs of the
vessels are not the only aspect to be painstakingly measured by the shipping
industry. An acceptable infrastructure to support navigation along the NSR could
cost millions of dollars to every member involved in Arctic transportation.

The

development of Satellite communication systems, Search and Rescue centers, as
well as Environmental Emergency response capabilities are needed to provide
immediate clean-up services must be developed by the shipping companies in order
to make the NSR a viable shipping route. Navigation along the NSR in the long term
is economically feasible while the creation of infrastructure to support shipping
activities along the NSR is just a matter of time.

International environmental protection organizations will impose great pressure to
prevent the development of the NSR. The assumption being transportation activities
along the NSR could accelerate the melting of ice and the destruction of the local
environment. However, the impact of shipping on the environment will be negligible
compared to the continuous crimes against the environmental conducted for many
years in the developed countries. The development of a new maritime trade route
that will link Europe and Asia is probably the only good thing which stems from the
environmental changes the planet has experienced over the last few decades.
However, the environmental benefits all can not be ignored, the melting sea ice will
open up a sea route which has the revolutionary opportunity for the shipping
industry to slash its shipping time in half, thereby cutting oil consumption and
shipping emission by a vessel by half.

The fuzzy comprehensive evaluation of the NSR, in terms of environmental,
insurance, technical and policy issues, stimulate the optimism of the shipping
industry for the budding economic use of the NSR, however, special attention needs
to be paid on the first and second level factors that will influence the development of
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the NSR. Based on the research conducted for the purposes of the FCEM second
level factors such as ice, draft, pollution, IT, ship design, icebreakers, politics, legal
and NSR fees are of great importance and as a matter of fact distance and fuel
consumption redundancy should not be the only factor to be considered for the
development of the NSR. Transit transportation along the NSR between Europe and
Asia is economically viable and could eradicate the costs and risks stemming from
piracy incidents as well probable maritime terrorism along the MSR. Piracy will
always be a mean for survival in developing countries and will never be successfully
eliminated. Yet the nexus between maritime piracy and terrorism operating under
the umbrella of international criminal organizations impose great pressure on the
shipping industry to develop a new secure maritime trade route that could actually
eliminate piracy and terrorist. The development of the Northern Sea Route will be
the second biggest revolution in which the shipping industry undertakes since the
time of Malcolm Mclean who established containerization and advanced the
development of a new shipping globalized economic era with no trade barriers and
increased global seaborne trade transportation.
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